



Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-92-018
Tuesday
28 January 1992

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Yugoslavia

UN Under Secretary Marrack Goulding arrived in "Republic of the Serbian Krajina" on 27 January and met with President Milan Babic. Belgrade radio reports that Babic said the visit signified "the first time the United Nations has considered the Serbian people in Krajina an equal partner in the conflict."

TANJUG reports that Babic was unable to accept "Vance's concept" that "the fact that the territory of Krajina has been treated as a territory within Croatia which will be put under UN protection." Babic conveyed to Goulding that he expected "the United Nations to be more flexible and find a way to modify Vance's plan and accept a plan we are offering."

After a second round of talks with Babic, Under Secretary Goulding pointed out that "Babic is now not in a situation to accept the UN plan and agree to cooperate with the troops." Mr. Goulding said that the decision to send the peacekeeping force cannot be decided unless the Security Council is "sure that all those concerned will cooperate with the UN troops."

Poland

President Lech Walesa stated that as a result of the downfall of the Soviet Union, "various dangers have accumulated, first and foremost economic, which could lead to a great famine" reports Warsaw TV. Walesa called for "large-scale aid" to the Commonwealth of Independent States to a "prevent a mass exodus of hungry refugees," in an interview with AFP. "I am not even thinking of nuclear arms, but of the wretchedness which will impel people to emigrate," he said, noting that "Poland is the nearest country."

At a meeting with Solidarity factory commissions President Walesa said he is "ready to resign" if it would help the Polish political and economic situation, PAP reports. He blames the current "bad situation" in the country on the lack of competitiveness in industry and the "collapse" of traditional markets.

According to PAP, in an interview with GLOB 23, Polish Government Press Spokesman Marcin Gugulski criticized media treatment of the current government saying that it has been characterized by "massive criticism" from "the very start." Gugulski claims he is not interested in cooperating with journalists "specializing in slander and rumors."

Czechoslovakia

In his weekly Prague TV interview Prime Minister Calfa comments on the Federal Assembly's decision to set a deadline for the national councils' agreement on the constitutional amendments under consideration on the parliament's structure and defining the president's powers as well as the federal government's. Calfa says that the government is "now beginning to come under pressure" because of the pending question of June elections and that the Federal Assembly has "let its impatience be known," according to Prague TV.

National Democratic Party's Cekani Speaks in Berat
*AU2701142692 Tirana ATA in English 0950 GMT
 27 Jan 92*

[Text] Tirana, January 27 (ATA)—The branch of the National Democratic Party in the town of Berat held a meeting with members and sympathizers of this party. On behalf of the Organizing Committee, the chairman of the National Democratic Party, Fatmir Cekani, explained to those present the first program of the party, the targets this political force intends to attain in the new elections.

Our party, said among others Mr. Cekani, is a mere opposition force to the party in power, determined to fight to eradicate communism in Albania. To this end it has to coordinate its work with the opposition forces. We will remove communists from the legislative power only by being united. When saying that we are anticommunists, this does not mean that we fight against rank and file communists, but we fight against those who had their hands stained in blood and an Albanian Nuremberg must be organized for this.

In conclusion he underlined that we will be represented at the parliament and the people will support us in this direction.

Then he answered the questions of those present and tackled in length with those on Leka Zogu, whom he described as embodiment of humanism and a man with great heart. In so far as the question what will Albania be a republic or monarchy, he replied that to this end, the people's view must be taken into consideration and that country needs a man who is Albanian.

PSSH's Dokle Protests 'Psychological Terror'

*AU2701211892 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
 in Albanian 1900 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Text] The People's Assembly session was planned to start as usual at 1600 GMT this afternoon, but it began after 1900 because of the meetings of the parliamentary groups. Namik Dokle, chairman of the Socialist Party's parliamentary group, asked for the floor at the start of the session, and read a statement on behalf of his parliamentary group. Arben Imami and Jani Jani, chairmen of the Democratic Party and Omonia parliamentary groups, also took the floor to express their views on this statement.

[Begin Dokle recording] Respected presidency and deputies, I have asked for the floor to make a statement on behalf of the Socialist Party's parliamentary group. The greatest worry throughout Albania today, in every hearth and home, is the rise of crime and the great threat posed to public peace and the safety of people's lives. Crime is challenging democracy. Criminals are putting themselves above the law and above public order and are waging unprecedented psychological terror against honest and innocent people.

Several successive incidents have shocked the public. Bruno Sula, a respected worker and father of two children, was murdered in the most scandalous fashion, in criminal cold blood, and in broad daylight. Meanwhile, although his murderer has been identified, he has not been found after several days, and only his photograph has been circulated. Hooligans are kidnapping children and terrorizing families, and yet they continue to roam in freedom. We have seen on television reports of two women murdered in broad daylight, an unimaginable sight in Albania. The people's honest sons and daughters are being threatened in 1001 ways, and they do not know where to turn for protection.

All this shows that the law and the authorities responsible for defending democratic legislation are not operating in Albania. The police blame the justice organs and vice versa. The vicious circle of shrugging off responsibility has now become an open invitation to violence and crime. We are approaching the new elections in an atmosphere that is not in any way correct or democratic.

At a meeting organized in Memaliaj, a representative of the Socialist Party [PSSH] was openly threatened with the words: We will murder you. Threats of this kind have been made in other areas, too.

The public has been informed of the incident that took place on 23 January in Bajram Curri, when a group of provocative rabble-rousers, some of them well known for acts of terrorism in the town, obstructed the meeting that Fatos Nano, PSSH chairman and a People's Assembly deputy, had planned to hold with the people of Tropoje. About three hours before this incident, explosives were quite openly thrown in the town's streets, while the forces of order stood on the sidelines. At the entry to the Palace of Culture where the meeting was to take place, groups of political provocateurs forcibly blocked the path, threatening the many people coming to the meeting with firearms. Meanwhile, the forces of order, instead of protecting legitimate political activity, gave free rein to this illegal and antidemocratic behavior. Various people, shouting the slogans Down with Fatos Nano and Long live Sali Berisha, etc., later threw stones at the PSSH building, broke the windows, and seriously damaged a car, endangering the driver's life. Once again, the forces of order headed by the local police chief not only failed to take any preventive measures against these acts of hooliganism and illegal assemblies but openly encouraged such behavior with their indifference.

Our state television and the communique of the Public Order Ministry called this an event that concluded without incident. We do not know what the television reporter Ilir Bucpapaj, and Deputy Television Director Skender Bucpapaj, who is acting in the director's absence, would in this case have called an incident. What other excesses does Public Order Minister Vladimir Hysi want, when the law is now being so flagrantly broken?

We are not ruffled by what has happened at Memaliaj, Bajram Curri, and elsewhere, and nor do we cast aspersions on the splendid traditions of the people of Malesia e Gjakoves or Laberia, with their hospitality, loyalty, and democratic spirit. We consider the provocative behavior of groups of people, in whatever place, to be diabolical attempts to incite the people to dissension and fratricide for the sake of electoral passions or a thirst for power. Anybody who backs such behavior or fails to denounce it supports a dictatorship of the streets and advocates the conduct of an electoral campaign with threats and under tension, against the will of the people.

Nobody can guarantee free and democratic elections with such behavior. Such behavior banishes us from Europe and from democracy and is a departure from the tradition of an assembly of men in which the people, having listened to everybody, think and decide who is best for them. The PSSh parliamentary group therefore demands that the peace and safety of people's lives must be secured before anything else. For this, we demand a tangible commitment from other political forces inside and outside the parliament. Our parliamentary group also demands:

1. Without dealing with any other issue first, we demand that the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Public Order Minister appear before this parliament with statements, reporting on what measures are being taken to ensure public peace.
2. Why has the criminal who murdered the worker Bruno Sula still not been caught, and when will he be handed over to the judgment of the people?
3. The Council of Ministers and the Public Order Ministry must analyze with a high sense of responsibility the situation in Tropoje and other critical areas to take all the necessary measures to ensure public peace and safety for the people everywhere. All the organizers of the illegal counter-rally in Tropoje and the police chief who did not enforce the law must be brought before the courts.
4. The Media Commission must send a report to the Television Directorate analyzing its work to avoid any further cases of the disinformation of the public for electoral purposes. A reply to this report must be submitted to the parliament.
5. The government and the local government authorities must take all the necessary measures to ensure the normal conduct of the electoral campaign in a democratic atmosphere and to safeguard the new People's Assembly elections that must take place as soon as possible. The people must be given conditions to vote without the threat of psychological or physical terror. A report on all these matters must be submitted to parliament before its dissolution. Until accurate and full replies are received, our parliamentary group will not enter into any other debate. We ask that the statements be made at 1000 tomorrow. [end recording]

ShIK's Kocollari Discusses Intelligence Service

AU2701174792 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1430 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] The purpose of today's news conference given by Mr. Irakli Kocollari, chairman of the National Intelligence Service [Sherbimi Informativ Kombetar, ShIK], the first such news conference given by a high-ranking ShIK official, was to outline the efforts made so far to organize from scratch an agency of this kind and to report on the results of the Sofia meeting of intelligence chiefs of the countries of the East, where only the Yugoslav representative was absent because of developments in his country.

Talking about the Sofia meeting, Mr. Kocollari said that its topics were the role intelligence services should play in the democratic processes taking place in former communist countries, the problem of the files of former security services of this kind, and the prospects for future developments. Kocollari said that the Sofia meeting was organized by the U.S. Center for Democracy together with the Bulgarian Interior Ministry, and that one of the reformers of the CIA, the service's director [as heard] William Colby, was also present.

In my contribution in Sofia, Mr. Kocollari said at the news conference, I stressed that the ShIK was created on the basis of a new law approved by the Albanian pluralist parliament and that everything has started from zero. We are therefore not talking about a reorganization of the ShIK, but its construction as a new body in the new economic and social order being built in Albania. I stressed at the Sofia meeting that the Achilles' heel of any intelligence service is the question of legal control, and that the ShIK, in contrast to the State Security Service, which was controlled solely by a secretary of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee, is under the legal control of various authorities such as the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Council of Ministers, the whole of the parliament's Legal Commission, and the Procurator General, who has the right to inspect our agency on the basis of the law.

Talking about the problems of the ShIK's structure, its chairman said we have proceeded on the basis of the standards of agencies of countries with a richer inherited experience of Western democracy, such as the CIA and the German, Austrian, Swiss, Italian, and other intelligence services.

When it was his turn to give his view on the problem of the files possessed by the former secret political police of the countries of the East, Mr. Kocollari said that [words indistinct], but when it came to the alternatives of preserving or burning, opening or closing these files, I stressed that for me personally the documents of the former State Security Service must on no account be burned, for academic and historical reasons. In history, a stone on which the punishment of a slave is recorded offers a glimpse of the legislation of the epoch when the sentence was given. The same is true of this period in the

history of our people. I therefore think that it would be a disaster for the files of the former State Security Service to be burned. I say that they should be preserved and opened when thought proper. Of course, I am not the person to decide such a thing.

Talking about the process of the formation of the ShIK, Mr. Kocollari said that the average age of its staff is 33-34 in all districts, while the average age of its officials is 28-29. Its staff has not been fully recruited, and a lot of work is necessary before there is a full complement in accordance with the law and the standards and experience of analogous organizations in the West. The seven kinds of crime at the center of the ShIK's concern are espionage, economic and political corruption, diversion, sabotage, attempts at abduction across the state borders, organized attempts to disrupt Albania's diplomatic relations with other countries, and the provocation of war with other states. The agency's work so far, Mr. Kocollari said at today's news conference, was judged at the Sofia conference to be better than that of the agencies of other Eastern countries.

Mr. Kocollari also replied to reporters' questions. Asked whether the ShIK will continue and conclude any cases left unsolved by the former State Security Service, he said that those cases considered to be reasonable will be pursued. More specifically, those people who have worked in the past against national interests, I stress national interests, must necessarily be prosecuted because we are dealing with a threat to the national cause, which we will defend to the end. Asked what criteria were employed for recruitment to the ShIK, Mr. Kocollari said that we are meticulously applying the law approved by the People's Assembly and the most advanced experience of Western countries. For instance, we are using the criteria of higher education, foreign languages, the absence of previous convictions, and a person's character and personal standing in society. Asked about rumors claiming that archives and documents relating to the State Security Service's past are

being destroyed, he replied that he categorically stated as a responsible official that all the documents have remained untouched, by which he meant the archives of the former Interior Ministry, which was shared in common with the State Security Service. As for the state archive, it does not as an archive depend on us. Asked about the examination of the files of the ShIK's present staff, he said that they have been studied individually. Asked whether information drawn from the archives of the former State Security Service will be used in the forthcoming electoral campaign, as in the last campaign, Mr. Kocollari stated that there are unambiguous criteria for the preservation of secret information. Not a line of it can be used in an electoral campaign. Anybody who does such a thing will be held accountable under the law. Asked about the agency's present staff, the reply was that our agency is much more [word indistinct] than the staff of Western services. The ShIK today has 34-46 percent of the staff of the former State Security Service.

Crowd Attempts To Loot Tirana Hospital Storehouse
AU2701181092 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1430 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] According to a report from the Tirana Public Order Division, about 300 people gathered at a storehouse containing a quantity of humanitarian aid on the territory of the No. 1 Hospital in Tirana at 0045 GMT on 27 January. The forces of order warned the assembled crowd and called on them to disperse. Meeting resistance, they reinforced their warning by firing guns, which led to most of the crowd dispersing, while a group of 20 persons including hospital staff, regardless of the demands of the police, broke the locks of the storehouse and entered. The police then closed the storehouse's doors, not allowing anyone to leave until reinforcements arrived at the scene. The persons involved were taken to Police Station No. 1. Articles in their possession were confiscated, and the case has been passed to the district investigator.

Zhelev, Dimitrov Meet Albanian Foreign Minister

*AU2501183992 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 25 Jan 92*

[Text] This morning Albanian Foreign Minister Ilir Bocka, who is on a short working visit to Bulgaria, was received by President Zhelyu Zhelev.

The president spoke about the situation in Bulgaria and the main features of the economic reform. During the conversation particular attention was paid to the principles of Bulgaria's foreign policy. Dr. Zhelev explained Bulgaria's position regarding recognition of the four Yugoslav republics.

The Albanian foreign minister briefed the president on the situation in Albania and set out Albania's standpoints on topical international problems.

Ilir Bocka was also received by Council of Ministers Chairman Filip Dimitrov, who reiterated Bulgaria's desire for peace and stability in the Balkans, which would guarantee economic development in the region. The Bulgarian prime minister also stressed Bulgaria's respect for the right of everyone to self-determination, in the context of the assessments made by the EC.

The Albanian foreign minister stated that his country considers that republics that leave the former Yugoslavia should receive international recognition, and that Albania is already taking steps in this direction.

It was established that a positive development is taking place in Bulgarian-Albanian relations, but much greater opportunities exist in the economic and cultural fields. Mr. Dimitrov expressed his wishes for the success of the processes that are evolving in Albania.

Here now is a brief statement made by Mr. Ilir Bocka for Radio Sofia:

[Begin Bocka recording in Albanian, fading into Bulgarian translation] I consider that my visit has been successful. Today I had the opportunity to meet the president of the Republic, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, and the Bulgarian prime minister, as well as representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The meetings convinced us that our viewpoints coincide on many issues.

As far as the events in Yugoslavia are concerned, the Albanian minister stated, we established complete unanimity both regarding the fact that Yugoslavia no longer exists in its previous form and regarding our attitude toward the new republics. We want the process there to continue to develop in a natural way, without shocks, in order to allow the situation in the Balkans to recover and to prevent causes of complications from arising, stated Mr. Ilir Bocka in his statement for the Khorizont Program. [end recording]

Bocka Views Kosovo, Macedonia

*AU2501193392 Sofia BTA in English 1904 GMT
25 Jan 92*

[Text] Sofia, January 23 (BTA)—Albania's assessment of Bulgaria's recognition of the four Yugoslav republics is positive, which is perfectly logical, as the Bulgarian position ensues from the practical application of the self-determination principles, Mr. Ilir Bocka, minister of foreign affairs of Albania, told the BTA reporter.

Mr. Bocka arrived here late last night on a working visit to exchange views on the situation in the Balkans, the Yugoslav crisis and Bulgarian-Albanian relations.

Today Albania's foreign minister was received by President Zhelyu Zhelev and by Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. His talks with Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev are to be held late tonight, when Mr. Ganev is expected to return from Washington.

Minister Ilir Bocka said that Albania which recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states had declared to Macedonia's leadership its readiness to recognize the republic's independence too, but there was "one factor—the Albanians who live in Macedonia." Later on he specified that Macedonia is expected to find a way for a dialogue and understanding with the Albanian population living on the territory of that republic. "The Albanians in Macedonia want to be placed on an equal footing with all the rest, they want political emancipation and we support their demands," the Albanian foreign minister stated.

President Zhelyu Zhelev stressed again Bulgaria's position that the recognition of the four Yugoslav republics as independent states contributes to the stability in the Balkans. In this way the danger is averted of what happened in Slovenia and Croatia to spread to other republics.

At the talks with President Zhelev and Prime Minister Dimitrov the shared desire was expressed for activating Bulgarian-Albanian cooperation. According to President Zhelev the two countries relations have been "somewhat neglected," but Bulgaria and Albania have interests in common and similar processes are under way in both of them.

The Albanian politicians often mention Bulgaria's formula of development, Mr. Ilir Bocka said. He added that the innovation processes in Albania are seven months behind the changes implemented in Bulgaria.

Albania's foreign minister, having visited Ankara and Skopje before he came to Bulgaria, said in reply to a journalist's question that the positions of Albania, Macedonia, Turkey and Bulgaria are very close in some aspects, but not identical.

In his opinion there is no reason to treat Kosovo in a different way from the way the other republics are treated. In his opinion Serbian chauvinism may take

actions in this region of the Balkans which would complicate the situation even more. "We do not know of any demands to have been raised at rallies or other events for the unification of the Albanians in Kosovo with Albania," Mr. Bocka said in response to another question. "This is something Belgrade is often repeating as an excuse for the efforts of the circles in Belgrade to preserve Kosovo's present status quo which runs contrary to law," the Albanian minister specified. He underlined that the Albanians in Kosovo deserve a praise for their patience which is constantly provoked, and yet they are full of hope as to the victory of the European spirit, Mr. Bocka said.

The Albanian foreign minister stressed there is nothing to hinder the promotion of contacts between Bulgaria and Albania on a summit level.

There are no problems between Bulgaria and Albania. Agreements on their consular relations and cultural cooperation are being prepared, a Bulgarian diplomat said. In his opinion the only reason for the slow pace of the promotion of their cooperation is the internal political processes going on in both countries.

Ministry Issues Statement on Balkan Relations

AU2701152492 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
18 Jan 92 p 1

[Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement; place and date not given]

[Text] The main task the Bulgarian Government has set for itself in its foreign policy is the development of good relations with all countries, beginning with its neighbors, of course. Bulgaria believes that it is its special obligation and responsibility to Europe not to intensify the problems in the Balkan region but to cooperate in resolving them.

Guided by this concept, the Bulgarian Government, with its decision to recognize the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, once again declares its resolve to defend the existing borders and that it has no territorial claims toward any state. This policy is in line with the commonly recognized principles and norms of international law, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe.

The recognition of the republics is based on respect for the lawful interests of the people living in these territories, for their legitimate wish for self-determination, and their right to determine for themselves their relations between each other and with other states. Bulgaria had the same approach toward relations with the republics from the former Soviet Union.

Democratic Bulgaria is constantly striving to conduct a European policy in the Balkans and to coordinate its actions with the general positive processes of the continent where the European Community plays such an

important role. The Bulgarian Government adopts the EC approach of treating all Yugoslav republics equally and considers the EC criteria for their recognition, while also noting the Arbitration Commission's position. Future steps regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with the republics will take into consideration the decision making process within the EC parameters.

The Bulgarian Government believes that this will contribute to the stability of the Balkans as part of the new Europe.

Friendship Treaty With Romania Detailed

AU2701181892 Sofia BTA in English 1715 GMT
27 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 27 (BTA)—Today Bulgaria and Romania signed a 20-year Treaty for Friendship, Cooperation and Goodneighbourliness. It was signed by Bulgaria's President Zhelyu Zhelev and Romania's President Ion Iliescu during his brief official visit to Sofia.

After the ceremony both presidents pointed out that the document shows the continuity in the historical tradition of Bulgarian-Romanian relations and expresses the common effort for their development in the name of goodneighbourliness and cooperation on equal terms. The document also expresses the two countries' readiness to contribute to the atmosphere of confidence and stability in the Balkans and in Europe in general.

President Zhelyu Zhelev said that the treaty is in line with the new priorities in Bulgaria's foreign policy and is an important part of the system of external political factors concerning this country's national security.

The treaty is in accordance with the profound political, economic and social changes in Romania, in Bulgaria, in Europe and around the world, said President Ion Iliescu.

The Bulgarian-Romanian treaty guarantees the inviolability of the borders, the two countries' territorial integrity and the settlement of controversial points by peaceful means. Neither of the parties will allow the use of its territory by a third party for aggression against the other.

The two parties prioritize the cooperation in environmental protection, both in bilateral aspect and together with third parties and international organizations. Bulgaria and Romania will cooperate for the preservation of ecological standards in the Balkans, the Danube and the Black Sea.

The treaty also envisages cooperation in the struggle against organized crime, drugs and arms trafficking, smuggling, international terrorism and the illegal export of works of art.

Bulgaria and Romania will develop and improve their relations in transport and communications. The treaty envisages a relaxation of customs and border formalities.

President Zhelyu Zhelev and President Ion Iliescu expressed satisfaction with their talks. "We established that Bulgarian-Romanian political relations are developing well on the basis of balanced interests and common ends," Bulgaria's president pointed out.

They pointed out the need for joint efforts and for coordination of the government authorities' actions in order to overcome the stagnation in trade and to create encouraging conditions for both state-owned and private companies.

Last year's cooperation in environmental protection was assessed positively. Steps were taken for the gradual elimination of this acute problem in Bulgarian-Romanian relations: A convention on environmental protection was signed and a mechanism was created for joint PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary]—financed projects along the common border.

President Zhelev described the exchange of views on the Balkan problems, especially on the Yugoslav crisis, as very useful. He confirmed Bulgaria's principled position, based on the respect for the nations' right to free and democratic self-determination and to the establishment of sovereign states. A logical consequence of this position is the recognizing of the independence of the four Yugoslav republics. "I believe that our position was met with understanding," Dr. Zhelev pointed out.

Romania's President Ion Iliescu described the talks as frank and friendly. "I believe they will contribute to the consolidation of Bulgarian-Romanian relations and to the promotion of cooperation in different spheres in the hard times of emerging democracy and transition to market economy," he said.

Zhelev Vows To Be 'President of All Bulgarians'

AU2701195592 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 23 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Bulgarian President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev by an unidentified BULGARSKA ARMIYA correspondent at the National Assembly Hall in Sofia on 22 January: "I Am the President of All Bulgarians"]

[Text] [BULGARSKA ARMIYA] In the plenary hall of the National Assembly there were no official speeches, but immediately after taking his oath, the newly elected President of the Republic Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev was surrounded by reporters and tried to satisfy their curiosity at least to a certain extent.

Mr. Zhelev, what prerogatives would you wish the president of the Republic to be endowed with so that he may better contribute to the development of the democratic process?

[Zhelev] I already pointed out on other occasions that the president should be entitled to legislative initiative. This is a necessity, considering the hardships to which

Bulgaria is currently subjected; it is required by the difficult conditions existing in the Balkans today and by the great tasks the presidential office—the most permanent institution according to our Constitution today—is expected to cope with.

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA] How do you feel at this very moment? Whose interests are you protecting?

[Zhelev] After being elected president of Bulgaria, I am the president of all Bulgarians.

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA] What is the president's first task?

[Zhelev] To do his job.

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA] Which changes can be expected in the president's office, and which criteria do you intend to conform with?

[Zhelev] This should depend on the tasks and on the basic priorities the president is expected to concentrate upon within the forthcoming period. Such priorities should be the guiding line of my work—namely the basic directive. The work of the relevant departments that are in charge of specific tasks will be organized accordingly, and their specific structure should be adjusted to the current tasks.

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA] Does the party affiliation of your aides play a role for you?

[Zhelev] No, I will look for qualified specialists, in the first place, to recruit honest people who are capable of coping with their tasks and are loyal to the president.

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA] Do you intend to promote amendments to the Constitution to expand your prerogatives?

[Zhelev] Why should we amend the Constitution? This may be a question of the future. The future is wiser and will show whether such amendments are really required.

SDS Seen as DPS 'Hostage' After Election

AU2701145992 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
22 Jan 92 p 8

[Stefan Prodev article]

[Text] So, the old president will occupy the new presidential chair. Mr. Zhelev won the election, albeit by a small majority, and for two days Bulgaria has for the first time a head of state who was elected in a general election. This is an especially important stage in our new political history. Despite the sharp preelection clashes, our society again demonstrated that it deserves the democracy it seeks. There was no violence at all along the road to the presidential office.

Certainly, many conclusions will be drawn from the contest between the presidential candidates. Political

scientists and sociologists are already exchanging contradictory opinions about the gradual political fatigue that is overcoming ever increasing parts of our society. Dr. Zhelev's election was not a triumph as some people expected. It turned out that without Dogan's "iron guard" the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]-Movement would not have been able to help its candidate. This is the source of the first conclusion, namely, that the dark blue politicians are increasingly becoming hostages of their political collusion with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS].

Another very important conclusion, which undoubtedly concerns a great part of our people, is the total blue coloring of the state and public institutions. As during the years of totalitarianism, today, too, the power in Bulgaria is concentrated in the hands of a single political force. The National Assembly, Council of Ministers, and now—the Presidency—are totally under the control of the SDS-Movement, something that sharply reduces the chances of political pluralism. This could confront us with dangerous social situations not only because of the exacerbating economic crisis, but also because of the overt social aggression of the rightist forces in the country.

There is another conclusion. One must point out that regardless of the total control over power, it is becoming more and more obvious that the SDS-movement is losing influence over its voters. The good performance of the Vulkanov-Vodenicharov tandem in the election shows not only the new tendency of the masses toward the left, but also the emergence of a chance for a diplomatic center. More and more people are searching for new participants in the political arena. For them, the blue idea, (as understood by the most rightist elements) has lost its past magic. Many are disappointed by that idea and are ready for a new dialogue not only among themselves, but also with the Bulgarian Socialist Party.

The new president will find it very difficult to continue his actions solely under the two-fingered victory sign. If he respects the nation he must relinquish this symbol for the sake of the national tricolor. It is only under the tricolor that he can unite all citizens, regardless of social polarization. Otherwise, whether he wants it or not, he will become a hostage to an aggressive doctrine that has no future.

Article Hails Zhelev's Election Victory

AU2701194792 Sofia ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME
in Bulgarian 21 Jan 92 p 1

[Dragomir Shopov article: "Justified Confidence"]

[Text] The emotions that accompanied the run-off of the presidential elections have subsided. It is not time for thorough assessments and analyses, which the specialists are expected to engage in. The most important thing for the time being is the fact that the majority of the voters resisted all manipulations and tricks, that they did not believe even a word of what the so-called independent

candidates' team said, but in all their sincerity and with a feeling of civic awareness they voted for the victory of democracy in Bulgaria.

I am convinced that all sensible Bulgarians made their choice as early as on the occasion of the so-called television debate between Zhelev and Vulkanov. The lack of self-control, the offensive insinuations, the nervous outbursts, and arrogant behavior of the "independent" candidate were hardly likely to promote his frantic ambitions for the high-ranking post. In this context, I am convinced that he is responsible for his own political failure.

Nevertheless, we cannot fail to point out that the difference in percentages between the two competing teams justifies a serious assessment. It reflects the existing division of our nation. At the same time, it eloquently indicates the direction in which the efforts of the president, the parliament, and the Council of Ministers should immediately focus. Dr. Zhelev unmistakably noted that the acceleration of the economic reform is the chief goal today. This is a question of crucial importance, indeed, that determines the future of our country and of our society.

Dr. Zhelev's election was a confidence vote, above all. I would like to call it a justified confidence. It relies on the president's hitherto accomplished successes in our Bulgarian foreign policy, which were solely dictated by the country's interests, and it relies on the preservation of civic and social peace. Therefore, we should all be self-confident and believe in our free opportunities of rescuing Bulgaria from the crisis in which our country was precipitated by shortsighted and treacherous politicians....

The united Agrarians supported Dr. Zhelev's nomination for the post of president. They did so in all sincerity because, as one of our readers expressed, Zhelev is a "proven democrat." Nevertheless, our support has another aspect, namely expectation and hope. Let us hope that the president of Bulgaria will justify our people's sensible expectations and justify the confidence on the basis of which he was elected by all our fellow citizens who are sincerely concerned about their homeland.

Council of Ministers Changes Arms Regulations

AU2701195992 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
22 Jan 92 p 2

[Emil Zdravkov report]

[Text] After the dissolution of one of the state monopolies in the arms trade, namely the Main Engineering Administration, the other giant in this business, the former Kintex Trading Company, is being fundamentally reformed. According to the Council of Ministers' 1 February decision the company will be transformed into a one-man trading association with state property and approximately 5 million leva capital distributed into

shares of 1,000 leva each. The shareholding company will import, export, and re-export arms, develop engineering and marketing activities, provide technical aid, and train cadres for this business. It is expected that we will shortly learn the name of Kintex's new chief who will be appointed by Filip Dimitrov.

In contrast to the previous situation, Kintex will now have competition in the form of private companies. Specific traders will be determined by a government commission for the supervision and control of arms production and trade. Sales permits will be signed in person by the minister of defense. Companies that do not hold such a document and that trade arms will be very severely penalized.

The amendment to the Law on Weapons Control is imminent. The bill on amendments is presently being prepared by the Legal Department at the Ministry of the Interior. According to Rumen Danov, presidential adviser on questions of national security, the amendments are aimed at increasing the personal safety of us all (it is expected that under certain circumstances we will receive the right to carry a weapon.) At the same time ²¹ the safety measures are being taken that will restrain us from reaching out for it too often.

Official Explains New Rules

AU2701192992 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 22 Jan 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Filip Filipov, "chairman of the Governmental Commission on Regulation of and Control Over Production and Trade With Military and Special Products," by BULGARSKA ARMIYA correspondent Major Krasimir Georgiev; place and date not given: "Weapons Trade Is Profitable When It Is Legal"]

[Excerpts] [Georgiev] What are the commission's goals and tasks? Could we see its creation as an attempt to restore Bulgaria's lost positions in the international weapons market?

[Filipov] The commission's name states everything in a clear and precise manner. It was created last year by

Minister Ludzhev's team, deputy prime minister at that time. We used as a foundation the international legal norms that regulate the world trade in weapons and the requirements of the International Trade Arms Regulation. We were especially influenced by the decisions the five superpowers adopted in Paris, which are aimed at uniting the efforts of all countries in introducing restrictions over the proliferation of weapons in the dangerous regions of the planet. As to the question of whether we will produce weapons the answer is simple: We have produced weapons, continue to produce them, and will produce them in the future. In its work the commission will also be led by the effort to restore a part of the lost positions in the weapons trade business. We aim to restore the good name of the Bulgarian merchant, who had an exceptionally good reputation in the past. [passage omitted]

[Georgiev] Who will have the right to trade in weapons in the future? What do you require from them?

[Filipov] As a country that heads along the road of democracy we must destroy the monopoly in this branch, while preserving all the positive elements. We primarily need experience and professionalism. This business, as any other business, is subject to the laws of market economy. Thus, the monopoly will certainly be eliminated. For the time being the state preserves its priority; however, other participants in this delicate process will gradually be allowed.

[Georgiev] What guarantees do you have that the weapons will not appear in the stores, or worse, in the open air free markets?

[Filipov] In addition to the commission and the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defense there also exists a Service on Control Over Dangerous Means. We will work jointly with those organs. They will also participate in the process of controlling the weapons trade. In addition, there is the relevant department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which deals with terrorism and illegal weapons traffic. However, I reiterate—anything that would leave our producers and appear in the black market could technically be acquired only by theft, not in a legal manner. [passage omitted]

Carnogursky on Possible Czech-Slovak Talks Failure

LD2601183992 Prague CSTK in English 1727 GMT
26 Jan 92

[Text] Vienna Jan 26 (CSTK correspondent)—Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky dealt with a possible failure of talks on a Czech-Slovak agreement in the weekend issue of the Austrian press, saying "in this case Slovakia would prefer the idea of a confederation which might lead to a declaration of sovereignty".

"This might also lead to calling a referendum (on Czechoslovakia's future arrangement) with an alternative of the country's breakup", Carnogursky said. He was referring to the protracted discussions between representatives of the Czech and Slovak national councils (parliaments) on the future of Czechoslovakia.

"In the event that the Czech-Slovak talks on (preserving) a common state fail, there is a threat of dramatising this problem not only in the pre-election struggle but also in the June (1992) elections", Carnogursky said. He stressed Slovakia favours a "common state but on the basis of the agreement between the two (Czech and Slovak) republics, a common state where link (between the republics) is looser than it has been so far".

Even Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel has proposed that only the ministries of foreign affairs, finance and defence fall within the powers of the federation, Carnogursky said. "The Czech partner, however, does not want to acquiesce in it", he added. According to him, a great threat for the future of the common state rests in the possibility that Czechs and Slovaks will be filled with disgust.

Calfa on Need To Finalize Czech-Slovak Treaty

LD2701122192 Prague Federal 1 Television Network
in Slovak 1850 GMT 25 Jan 92

[Interview with CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Ten Minutes With the Prime Minister"—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] Prime Minister, the suspension of the Federal Assembly debate on the amendment to three chapters of the constitutional law—concerning the future structure of the parliament, giving it greater powers, and defining the president's powers as well as the position of the federal government, was the main political event this week. Agreement on this will be possible, however, only after the Czech and Slovak national councils reach agreement. What is your view? Do you envisage that they will succeed in concluding a treaty by the date set?

[Calfa] In my view, parliament made the right decision. It made the right decision because we agreed in Kromeriz almost a year ago that a treaty to be concluded between the Czech and Slovak sides will form the basis of constitutional relations or a framework for such

constitutional relations. The structure of the highest federal bodies should, of course, form a part of such an agreement. The Federal Assembly—or rather the deputies who submitted this draft bill—proceeded, however, from the premise that it is necessary to tackle the situation since the election is approaching. Therefore, it will be necessary to know what kind of structure the federal bodies will have because the federal parliament will, in fact, be elected at this election. In other words, we must have something, a structure, to which voters can send their candidates. This, too, was the president's idea.

On the other hand, it is clear that we would prefer to proceed from a treaty. A treaty should form the basis of our future statehood. The fact is, however, that the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council have simply failed to reach a conclusion. They have been discussing these matters for quite a long time and yet there still exist different views on the content of that treaty. There are even different views about who, in fact, will be the subject of such a treaty, who will sign it, etc.

We are now beginning to come under time pressure. If we want to hold the election in June it will be necessary to have a treaty ready to enable us to prepare a constitution and an electoral law so that we can indeed hold the election in June, all of which needs time. In my view, therefore, although parliament made the right decision, by setting a date—in this case 17 February—parliament let its impatience be known. It is applying pressure to have this matter finally resolved. I believe that it can really be resolved. These issues are too important to permit the interests of individual political parties let alone individual politicians dictate matters. Such interests do exist and this must be admitted frankly. We are talking about the future of 5.5 million [Slovak] people and, therefore, these matters must be set aside and, in my view, we should arrive at a conclusion.

Both national councils—or rather their representatives—have now, in effect, agreed to set up a working group which should go over the core of the treaty once more and put it together. Let us hope that this working group achieves a result. Therefore, in my opinion, this step expresses impatience and says that this matter must finally be resolved.

[Correspondent] In the context of privatization a number of political parties and movements currently blame the federal government for selling the CSFR's national assets on the cheap. What is your view on this?

[Calfa] I am not aware that we have sold any assets. So far no assets have been sold. As far as the range of powers is concerned, a great majority of production industries have, in fact, been transferred within the range of powers of the republics. [passage omitted]

At the federal government level we have not taken any steps to sell any enterprises to anyone abroad. This is really not the case. Thus I understand your question to mean what regulations are we preparing to link our

enterprises with foreign capital, i.e. for foreign capital to enter our enterprises. I do not at all fear foreign capital entering our enterprises because we do need it. Our enterprises are not capable of getting out of their current situation using only their money or state money. On the contrary, my fear is that there could be a shortage of such capital. Unfortunately, we have taken a number of steps in the political sphere which in a way scare capital away from Czechoslovakia. Thus, on the contrary, my feeling is that we should in some ways attract capital, we should make a gesture to attract capital to our country. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] To what extent did you manage to fulfill your election promises?

[Calfa] You know, our activities can hardly be viewed as something done between two elections. The elections two years ago were probably not elections in the true sense of the word. They were some kind of expression of people rejecting the previous developments and demanding that developments take another course. What course? We have chosen a certain scale of values which is typical for West European societies, for Western Europe, for highly developed industrial democracies. I think we made the right choice. [passage omitted]

When we look back at the situation two years ago, what we have achieved is not so little though it is quickly forgotten. This includes the departure of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia after 20 years—the fact that we broke down the walls around our border—our people travel abroad freely according to their wishes all around Europe, all around the world. We have changed our foreign political orientation, in fact breaking the Warsaw Pact, leaving behind those distorted relations with the former CEMA states, and we have also carried out an internal change—a fundamental change of ownership relations in our state. An entirely new structure of people has been formed—new management, new entrepreneurs, people begin to take care of their future, they are aware of their future prospects, etc. [passage omitted]

National Council Heads on Federal System Talks

LD2601124692 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 23 Jan 92

[Interview with Czech National Council Chairman Dagmar Buresova and Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko by correspondents Magda Pospisilova and Michal Tvarozek at Bratislava Castle on 23 January—recorded; Buresova speaks in Czech]

[Excerpts] Coalition representatives of the Czech and Slovak national councils held talks in Bratislava Castle today. What is the news?

[Pospisilova] Shortly before 1700 they entered the Federation Hall. The meeting ended. What was the outcome? The outcome was influenced substantially by the fax message received from the Federal Assembly, which

reached Bratislava Castle before 1300. [passage omitted] The meeting with Dagmar Buresova and Frantisek Miklosko, the respective chairpersons of the national councils, in the lobby room was mainly about how the newly elected commission will push the talks forward.

[Buresova] We anticipate that the commission will meet on 3 February and remain in session until it delivers the required material. It will of course have specialists at its disposal. The executive, too, will be at its disposal. We will attend these meetings. Some of us are members of that commission and we anticipate the material we as presidiums have already prepared to be completed by the commission in a truly consistent form, and not to contain conflicting points which we note from time to time, because as the material is emerging gradually it is not always consistent.

[Pospisilova] How will the commission start its work?

[Miklosko] We will endeavor to create a timetable for the whole two weeks. The core of the commission will be composed of deputies. If possible we want to have deputies at the commission from the presidiums.

[Tvarozek] Is the establishment of that commission not like shifting a hot potato from one hand to another?

[Buresova] Not really, since its political task must be worked out beforehand by the presidiums. This political task could not have been given earlier since we did not possess groundwork material. Therefore, as we did not have such a task formulated we could not have charged a commission with working on it. Specialists would then have been working on something without foundations. We have now reached a stage where we know precisely what we have agreed on, where we have to do some more work, and where we have not as yet reached agreement. We will have to take another look in particular at where we have not yet reached agreement. However, I truly believe that the matter has now reached the point at which intensive work by the commission for a week or a fortnight may bear some fruits.

[Miklosko] Moreover, let us not make any secret of the fact that some problems are of a more crucial character, while others are rather of a technical character, where they have to be clarified, and that this will be the role of the specialists.

[Pospisilova] You said that you wanted to tackle the contentious issues this afternoon. You said that you agreed on the commission this morning, and that you were going to devote the afternoon to finding solutions. Have you done so?

[Buresova] We took stock of the contentious issues.

[Miklosko] In principle these involve banking issues, where a joint solution has to be found, communications, transport, mutual relationship between the federal constitution and the national ones, which is linked with the problem of ratification.

[Buresova] Foreign policy, customs, protection of state borders.

[Pospisilova] 15 February is the final date. You also regard this as the final one. What will happen if you fail to reach an agreement?

[Miklosko] I think it will have to be said that we failed to agree, that the old constitutional situation continues to apply, or rather that we will do everything in order to prevent any unconstitutional steps and to ensure that life goes on calmly. Other countries have been tackling similar problems for decades.

[Buresova] I would like to underline this since this problem has been tackled in Belgium for the past 20 years. I am not saying and I am not promising that we are going to tackle this matter for such a long time. Should we however not agree, the old constitution would remain in operation. The problem would be that unless the Federal Assembly itself passes the three chapters of the constitution, or at least the chapter on executive power, the election would then take the form of electing a Federal Assembly in its existing form. We know that this form is not particularly suitable.

[Pospisilova] Would the national councils deprive themselves of the opportunity to influence the Federal Assembly?

[Buresova] We will endeavor to reach an agreement. If we fail then we will have no option but to say that we failed to reach an agreement and we will have to return the whole matter to the Federal Assembly to decide whether it should adopt these chapters of the constitution now being prepared, which, as we told you this morning, the Federal Assembly has put off to give us one more opportunity to influence, with own ideas, the structure of the future federation.

[Miklosko] The situation as it happened today has shown that links between the national councils and the Federal Assembly are closer than we thought. The problem has not been resolved, either at the level of the national councils or at the federal level. Therefore common interest must exist, and it is apparent that without a movement at the national councils' level we can expect serious problems at the federal level too.

[Pospisilova] How do you assess the basic issue, for instance who will in fact sign the treaty—the republics or the national governments?

[Miklosko] We have not as yet reached an agreement on this issue.

[Tvarozek] Where will this commission be sitting?

[Miklosko] This is still a secret.

[Buresova] And it will remain so.

Klaus Explains Investment Coupon Registration *LD2501165192 Prague CSTK in English 2243 GMT 23 Jan 92*

[Text] Prague Jan 23 (CSTK)—While Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus today said investment coupons registration will be possible also after January 31, Czechoslovak Prosecutor General Ivan Gasparovic proposed its interruption until publication of privatisation projects.

Speaking to journalists after a federal cabinet session, Klaus said one registration centre will be opened in each of the ten former regional capitals also in February. Originally the registrations were to end on January 31. To date 4.7 million citizens have registered their coupons and the figure is expected to reach seven million by the end of January, Klaus said. The original estimate was four million.

The registration process has been hindered by a sudden and thus far unexplained lack of coupon booklets last week though eight million of them had been issued. The situation has been solved by selling special cards replacing the booklets. All Czechoslovak citizens over 18 are entitled to buy coupons enabling them to buy stakes in state enterprises to be privatised. A total worth of 250,000 million crowns (8,000 million US\$) are destined for privatisation in the first wave which will probably start in March and go on through June.

Klaus said about 237 investment privatisation funds have been registered with the Federal Finance Ministry which allows them to take part in coupon privatisation. He also announced that the government decree on coupon privatisation will be amended by the end of next week in order to prevent speculation. As proper legislation on coupon privatisation has been missing, some funds are buying out coupons for their potential investors which may result in a few monopolies controlling the country's economy. Klaus confirmed the preliminary round will start February 17 as planned. Only then will citizens be allowed to place their coupons with investment privatisation funds, Klaus said. In fact, however, thousands of people have done so already now, being allured by the funds' agents campaigning outside registration centres.

Coming to the government's session, Gasparovic said the process of registration should be interrupted until publication of approved projects for turning to private hands the enterprises included in coupon privatisation. He said the registration of coupon booklets should have been started only after the publication of the privatisation projects. It started already last November. Approving privatisation projects, whose number runs into thousands, started only at the beginning of January and it is not yet sure whether all of them will be ready by February 17.

Privatization Process To Continue in Border Areas
*LD2401192692 Prague CSTK in English 1155 GMT
24 Jan 92*

[Text] Prague Jan 24 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky today said in no case is the current federal government willing to conclude any agreement with Germany which would question Czechoslovakia's border and integrity and property ownership, particularly in the former Sudetenland.

Responding to questions by federal parliament deputies, Rychetsky said nor is the federal government willing to stop the current process of privatisation in the Czech-Slovak border areas. Rychetsky was referring to the initialled Czechoslovak-German friendship treaty which Czechoslovakia expects to be signed without any amendments by mid-February.

The signing of the treaty is being held up by demands of the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft which disagrees with the auctioning off of property of Sudeten Germans forced to leave Czechoslovakia after World War II. (2.6 million of the total of 3.5 million Germans living in Czechoslovakia before World War II had to leave.)

Ministry Seeks Ways To Pull Privatization Licenses
*LD2501191992 Prague Federal 1 Television Network
in Czech 2130 GMT 24 Jan 92*

[Text] Coupon privatization problems continue. The Czech prosecutor general today admitted that prosecutor's office officials and those of the relevant ministry are examining the legal possibilities of withdrawing licenses from investment privatization funds should the need arise. The director of the service protecting Czech economic interests says that state-owned banking institutions establishing investment privatization funds and the presence of top officials from these institutions, from the federal Finance Ministry and the Ministry Administration of National Property and Privatization, on the boards of individual funds are probably not in line with the coupon privatization's intentions.

The fact is that the information these people have on the economic situation and on the possible future of privatized enterprise is higher than among other citizens. This policing service is currently not investigating any criminal activity related to the coupon privatization. However, it is important to note that Federal Deputy Prime Minister Pavel Rychetsky's said that, given the great public interest in coupon privatization, it will be very

difficult to gather a sufficient volume of assets for the first wave of this privatization method.

The Czech prosecutor general reports that privatization projects involving a mere 35 billion korunas in assets have been approved so far out of the 140 billion korunas in assets earmarked for the first wave of the coupon privatization.

Slovak Ministry Defends Gabcikovo Construction
*LD2501201292 Prague CSTK in English 1632 GMT
25 Jan 92*

[Text] Bratislava Jan 25 (CSTK)—Slovak Ministry of Forest and Water Management representative Gabriel Jencik today defended in an interview for CSTK the decision by the Czechoslovak and Slovak governments to complete the Gabcikovo water dam project on the Danube. On January 22, a new version of completing the controversial Czechoslovak-Hungarian twin-dam project was made public. The version retains the canals and other parts of the power station already built at Gabcikovo, western Slovakia. But it does not entail power generation at the Hungarian part of the project at Nagymaros.

Jencik was referring to a Hungarian Government adviser's article published in the Hungarian daily NEP-SZABADSAG on January 23, which said "there is no money allocated on the completion of the project in the federal budget, and 50 million crowns (1.67 million USD) in the Slovak budget are not sufficient for the completion". Slovak First Deputy Finance Minister Belo Bosak said the federal and Slovak finance ministers are expected to find financial means for the completion of Gabcikovo by the end of January 1992. "Obviously, it will not be money that will obstruct the construction of the Gabcikovo dam project", he stressed. Czechoslovakia and Hungary decided to build the twin-dam project in 1977. Hungary stopped work on both dams in 1989 for environmental reasons, while Czechoslovakia continued construction at Gabcikovo.

Jiri Novak Appointed Czech Justice Minister
*LD2401172392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko
Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 24 Jan 92*

[Text] Today's meeting of the Czech National Council Presidium appointed a new justice minister for the Czech Republic. The new minister is Jiri Novak from the Civic Democratic Party, currently chairman of the Constitutional and Legal Committee of the Czech Parliament.

Antall Not To Attend UN Talks for Health Reasons
LD2801002892 Budapest MTI in English 1526 GMT
27 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 27 (MTI)—Below we carry an edited version of a communique released by the Hungarian prime minister's press office today:

Hungary will be represented by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, as one of the prime minister's deputies and a personal emissary, at a UN Security Council summit in New York January 31. Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall held talks today with British Ambassador John Allan Birch and U.S. Ambassador Charles H. Thomas about the UN Security Council summit, and presented to them letters addressed to British Prime Minister John Major and U.S. President George Bush.

In the letters, Antall explained that though he had formerly accepted an invitation to the summit from the British head of government acting as current UN Security Council president, his doctors advised him against making a trip overseas only a few weeks after pre-scheduled after-treatment. Although treatment has not obstructed him in fulfilling his responsibilities in Hungary, he was counselled to omit this short, 72-hour journey.

At the talks, Antall remarked that the forthcoming New York conference will first of all assess results achieved by the UN, and the organization's development, and will emphasize its present role. Soon, however, attention should focus on its future and related questions of organization and content, whereby it will be necessary to bring developments into harmony with the requirements posed by the new situation after the recent changes in international politics. Special importance must be attached to the UN's ability to respond quickly, the communique reports about the Hungarian Prime Minister's talks with the two ambassadors.

Jeszenszky Urges Western Aid to CIS, Yugoslavia
AU2801111292 Vienna ORF Television Network
in German 2116 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Studio interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Elmar Oberhauser in Vienna—live; Jeszenszky statements in Hungarian with simultaneous German translation]

[Text] [Oberhauser] You are the foreign minister of a country that has undergone dramatic political and social developments in the past few years. Your former fraternal country, the former Soviet Union, is now at the beginning of such socio-political changes. In your opinion, how stable is the situation in the states of the current CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]?

[Jeszenszky] There can be no doubt that we are witnessing a political change. The world power Soviet Union has ceased to exist, which means that the political

makeup of the entire world has changed. This new situation results in a lack of stability, a fact the whole world is faced with. Will the situation in the new states of the former USSR be equally unstable? One can only approach this issue optimistically. The tragedy, the civil wars cannot mean such a situation with which we will be able to fight. [sentence as heard]

Situations may occur that are tragic. The politicians of the world, in particular those who are affected by the history in this region, must do everything they can to make the great changes in the Soviet Union lead to a more stable situation. After all, there is no precedence for the current developments in such an enormous state. It is not a foregone conclusion that the situation in the many new follow-up states will be more unstable. Actually, everybody knew that the former world power would one day cease to exist, that new flags would have to be pinned onto the map of the world. All these countries have the desire to free themselves from former suppression. All those countries also share the same desire, namely not having to live with the fear of a nuclear war.

[Oberhauser] In your opinion, is the West able to contribute to greater stability?

[Jeszenszky] First of all, the West may help by not showing blind faith in the new democracies, or the emerging democratic institutions. The West must provide help so that the new states, the new democracies can survive, that people in these new democracies have enough to eat. After the 1917 revolution, millions of people starved to death there. So these countries need rapid help. Moreover, the governments that now exist there must be supported so that they become more stable. They may not exactly know what democracy really is, but they are anxious to have democracy and not dictatorship. New constitutions have to be drawn up. All these states must be helped to fit into Western systems. Western assistance will help those democracies to avoid the traps on their future paths.

[Oberhauser] Let us now talk about Hungary. In the past few months—virtually overnight—Hungary has suddenly become faced with three new neighbors: the Ukraine, Slovenia, and Croatia. Hungary now has an immigration problem. If my information is correct, then last year alone, some 100,000 immigrants arrived in Hungary. In Austria some people fear that this might have an effect on Austria, that many people might go to Austria and apply for asylum. How will Hungary deal with this problem? Will Hungary also close borders, will it introduce compulsory visas? Most of these people come from the former Soviet Union, from Romania, and from China.

[Jeszenszky] I do not think that we really need to fear that Hungary's problem will be shifted to Austria. The contrary is true. Hungary might fear that Austrian problems may be exported to Hungary. Public opinion might exert pressure on the government and ask: What is the Hungarian Government doing in this new situation? I

think that Austria and Hungary have the same interest: Hungary is in a buffer zone, and Hungary must remain stable in this buffer zone. Hungary must also fight against all those problems, although we are not faced with millions of immigrants; actually the number is even less than 100,000.

Nevertheless, there are certainly a few thousand who have come to Hungary and might want to proceed to Austria or even further west. Yet, there are also people who have entered Hungarian territory illegally. It means that in Hungary the problem is not one of open or closed borders, because we do not have the intention to move the Iron Curtain from our western to our eastern border. Still, this new situation means that as a state we are now facing problems that could be tackled more easily in a police state. Not very many people have come to Hungary legally, with a valid visa.

It means that what we have to take care about—and this is the challenge we share with Austria—is that as few people as possible who entered our countries illegally remain on Austrian and Hungarian territories. Some of those who entered Hungary did not do so with evil intentions, but they are refugees. Tens of thousands of people fled from Romania to Hungary under Ceausescu's dictatorship.

We must accept political refugees in our country, but we cannot accept economic refugees. It is also in the interest of both countries that the civil wars end in Yugoslavia, and that the new states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia are accepted as members of the community of European states, and that these countries achieve stability. This will open the doors to a new world and southeastern Europe will practically cease to exist. That region always meant a great deal to both Hungary and Austria. The newly emerging states on this territory may mean a great deal to Austria and Hungary in the future, too. The entire eastern bloc as a single entity and a single market has also disappeared. This is another new situation that we must come to terms with. A new market has been created, a market that has to be developed, which will certainly take a few more years.

Secretary Bogar Comments on Aid Program for CIS

LD2701164792 Budapest MTI in English 1550 GMT
27 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 27 (MTI-ECONews)—“The best Hungary can hope for is that by getting involved in the western aid programme to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), it will be able to reduce some of the 500-million-USd trade debt accrued in Hungarian-Soviet trade last year,” Laszlo Bogar, state secretary at the Ministry of International Economic Relations, told the press here today. Bogar attended an international “lifeline” conference over the weekend on western aid to the CIS.

The state secretary said that Hungary and four other donor countries in Eastern Europe can realistically

expect to have a 50 per-cent slice of the EC aid of 1.25 billion ECU [European currency units], which the EC intends splitting amongst the five applicants (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania).

Hungary could immediately deliver 200 million US dollars' worth of foodstuffs, 150 million US dollars' worth of medicines and pharmaceuticals equipment, as well as other goods and services to the Commonwealth of Independent States. But in order to be able to do so, the EC, the US and Japan, should multiply the present amount of aid, the state secretary said.

Bogar told newsmen it remains uncertain just how the various countries will take part in the aid package. What should be avoided at all costs, he went on, is a situation whereby countries which can provide their suppliers with the largest amount of state support go on to get the bulk of the orders.

In Hungary, the competition for the CIS aid will be supervised by a “rapid deployment force” from the inter-ministry committee which coordinates PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] assistance here, Bogar said. The state secretary said that the real solution to the problems of the successor states of the Soviet Union lies in various development credits, and in the mobilization of internal resources, like the retraining of workers. Hungary would also like to be involved in this latter, he added.

‘Difficult’ Hungarian-Romanian Treaty Talks Open

LD2701135292 Budapest MTI in English 1304 GMT
27 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 27 (MTI)—“The first round of expert talks on the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty began in Budapest today. Bilateral relations are burdened by a few difficult question which will probably need another round of negotiations to solve,” Foreign Ministry Secretary of State Tamas Katona said speaking on Hungarian television this morning.

As far as clarification of the border issue is concerned, Hungary deems it is natural that the basic treaty should contain a reference to the 10 points of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. Hungary has no secret intentions about the borders, which it considers inviolable, but rather aims at making them crossable through as many doors as possible. The first and foremost task is to intensify bilateral business links.

The second question under debate concerns the minorities, with a different weight for the two countries. Hungary has a 20,000-strong Romanian minority, ethnic Hungarians in Romania number more than 2 million, the secretary of state said. Hungary would like to see a European charter setting out the basic norms for the

treatment of minorities as soon as possible. This will serve as the same point of reference as the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter.

The Hungarian negotiating basis is open and unambiguous. Hungary has no secret intentions towards Romania, Tamas Katona said and added that, by contrast, the Romanian draft document includes a lengthy preamble attacking Hungary.

Speaking about the frequent anti-Hungarian statements in the Romanian press, Katona pointed out that the Romanian press also shows initial signs of democratization. However, this new freedom of the press is also used for manipulation: What the Bucharest government cannot say officially, it has done so through the government papers, Katona added.

Jeszenszky on 'Tug of War' on Slovak Dam Project

LD2701092192 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky has been visiting Debrecen. The Hungarian foreign minister said that Hungary represents Slovak interests as well when it takes a stand against the construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydropower plant. At his news conference in Debrecen, Geza Jeszenszky stated that he does not consider the tug of war surrounding the power plant a Hungarian-Slovak conflict. At the same time, he expressed his hope that soberness will prevail in the affair and that it will not be prestige issues that are asserted. [passage omitted]

Military Monitoring Exercise Held With FRG

AU2701125592 Budapest MTI in English 1644 GMT
23 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, 23 January (MTI)—The Hungarian Army and the German Bundeswehr carried out new military monitoring exercises from January 19 to 23, the Hungarian Defence Ministry said today. Under the treaty on the reduction of European conventional armed forces, the Germans monitored an armoured infantry division in Abasar, N. Hungary, and an Air Force regiment after preliminary notice, and made an unannounced visit to an airport near Budapest. The Hungarian group inspected operations in Darmstadt, Dortmund, Lengon, and in the vicinity of Hardheim.

Oil Pipeline Damage Estimated at 10m Forints

AU2701124892 Budapest MTI in English 1915 GMT
22 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, 22 January (MTI)—Undoing the damage caused by last Sunday's rupture of the Friendship oil pipeline are expected to run over 10 million forints, said Gabor Jozsef, Hungarian Oil and Gas Co. (MOL) acting manager. The repair itself and cost of the lost oil alone cost the company more than 2 million forints, Jozsef said. However, the highest costs will come

from the removing and cleaning of the oil-polluted soil which will push total clean-up costs to over 10 million forints.

Jozsef also said replacing an aged, 10-kilometer section of the pipeline will cost some 200 million forints. A further 40-kilometer section should also be renewed for secure operation, however, the MOL lacks the money to make these improvements.

Political Party Membership Figures Published

AU2401130692

[Editorial Report] Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian on 23 January on page 9 carries a 2,000-word report on the present situation and strength of the six parliamentary parties at mid-term compiled by Attila Farkas and Pal Szombathy under the headline: "Parliamentary Parties at the Middle of the Electoral Cycle—Facts, Plans, and Hopes—1992."

The report consists of a compilation of data on each party, and a brief general statement by the following party representatives: Imre Furmann, general deputy chairman of Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]; Gabriella Beki, executive member of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]; Jozsef Torgyan, chairman of the Independent Smallholders Party [FKgP]; Imre Szekeres, executive deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]; Terezia Csaszar Szilagyi, deputy chairperson of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]; and Zsolt Nemeth, member of the presidium of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]. The statistics given for the parties are as follows:

MDF

"The party's membership is approximately 30,000, some 30 percent from Budapest. The majority are between the ages of 30 and 55 and 10 percent are retired. The MDF's parliamentary faction has 159 members. Some 68 mayors and 891 deputies belong to the MDF in the local governments of settlements of less than 10,000 inhabitants. Some 26 mayors and 602 deputies work in settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants. It is worth remarking that 90 deputies were elected by the joint support of the KDNP and the MDF, 44 by the FKgP and the MDF, and 94 by the joint support of the coalition parties in these settlements.

"Jozsef Antall is the chairman of the MDF, and Lajos Fur executive chairman.

"Imre Konya is the leader of the parliamentary faction."

SZDSZ

"Party membership is 32,258; 9,623 in Budapest and 22,635 in the provinces. The SZDSZ has approximately 900 organizations grouped around 29 regional offices. The number of SZDSZ parliamentary representatives is 88.

"The SZDSZ has 56 mayors and 752 deputies in the settlements with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. In settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants and in the capital, some 803 SZDSZ deputies were elected, and 453 people were given a mandate as joint deputies of the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ. It has a total of 60 mayors in the larger settlements and the SZDSZ-member Gabor Demszky is the mayor of Budapest.

"Peter Tolgyessy is the chairman of the SZDSZ.

"The leader of the party's parliamentary faction is Marton Tardos."

FKgP

"The party's membership is 60,000, and more than 1,630 FKgP organizations operate in the country. The FKgP has 45 parliamentary representatives but the faction that is considered to be legitimate by the national presidium and the general board of the FKgP counts 12 members at the moment. (According to a decision, the FKgP does not consider the group of 33 deputies led by Gyula Pasztor to be part of the party.) The FKgP has 108 mayors and 1,278 deputies in settlements with less than 10,000 inhabitants. It has 11 mayors and 279 deputies in settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants, and in the 1990 local government elections, some 44 deputies were elected by the joint support of the MDF and the FKgP and 94 were elected as joint FKgP, KDNP, and MDF candidates.

"Jozsef Torgyan is the chairman of the FKgP.

"Emese Ugrin is the leader of the parliamentary faction."

MSZP

"Party membership is some 40,000; a third of them live in Budapest, two-thirds are active workers, and one-third are retired. An interesting fact is that 40 percent of the members have a degree of higher education. The MSZP has affiliated organizations in 345 settlements, and it has 1,844 basic organizations. The number of its parliamentary deputies is 33. Some 600 MSZP deputies work in local government, and 60 mayors and 10 deputy mayors also belong to the party.

"Gyula Horn is the chairman of the MSZP.

"Zoltan Gal is the parliamentary faction leader."

KDNP

"The party's membership is approximately 18,000. Some 90 percent of the membership lives in the provinces, and 25 percent are under the age of 35. The KDNP has 21 parliamentary representatives. Some 1,200 deputies work in local governments and this party supplied 120 mayors.

"Laszlo Surjan is the party's chairman.

"Tibor Fuzessy is the parliamentary faction leader."

FIDESZ

"The FIDESZ has 13,252 members and 468 groups. The party's parliamentary faction has 22 members. FIDESZ has 195 local government deputies in settlements with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and provides the mayors of 15 communities. It has mayors in 10 towns and two Budapest districts, and it has 586 deputies in settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants, including the local governments of Budapest and its districts. At the local elections, some 453 people became deputies as joint SZDSZ and Fidesz candidates.

"The FIDESZ is led by a 13-member elected committee.

"The party's parliamentary faction leader is Viktor Orban."

Walesa: Poland Will Fly Soviet Refugees to West
AU2301135492 Paris AFP in English 1328 GMT
 23 Jan 92

[Michel Leclercq report]

[Text] Warsaw, Jan 23 (AFP)—Polish President Lech Walesa appealed for large-scale aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States to prevent a mass exodus of hungry refugees and warned that Poland would fly the refugees to "Japan or the West" rather than bear the burden of feeding them. In an interview with AFP, Walesa said the flood of refugees was the biggest danger following the collapse of the Soviet Union. "I am not even thinking of nuclear arms, but of the wretchedness which will impel people to emigrate," he said, noting that "Poland is the nearest country."

Walesa urged large-scale help for the CIS to prevent the exodus and warned of the repercussions of the collapse of "this giant" on its neighbours. There was not much to share with refugees in Poland, he noted, adding: "Those who have a lot to fear are the Westerners. I understand the poor and I will give planes to the refugees to transport them to Japan and the West. I will give them every possible means of transport."

Poland attended this week's Washington session on CIS aid. With Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it suggested that some of their food and medicine be bought with international funds for re-export to the CIS. Walesa also cautioned CIS member states against using the same shock therapy Poland had endured in two years of radical reform to convert to a market economy.

Poland is suffering deep recession, with gross domestic product down eight percent last year and unemployment soaring to almost 12 percent of the active population.

"There must be at least two Leszek Balcerowicz, with the second obliged to repair the damage done by the first," he commented wryly, referring to the finance minister under the two previous Solidarity governments who followed strict austerity policies. But the Polish leader said he had no fears about a social explosion in Poland despite growing discontent. There were no threats of fighting or arson, no anarchy, he said. The populace was calling for reforms in a civilised, not a destructive, manner.

Asked about the sharp New Year rise in energy prices, which has sparked a lot of strikes, the pioneer Solidarity chief criticised the way the hikes had been imposed and said he was asking the unions and the government to compromise. The authorities ought to seek agreement with the unions beforehand and find arguments to persuade those they governed, he advised.

Walesa said he sided both with the citizenry calling for improved government programmes and with the rulers who were trying "more or less efficiently" to introduce reforms. Despite his public hostility to Prime Minister

Jan Olszewski, who has been heading a fragile centre-right coalition for just a month, Walesa acknowledged the government had not been in office for long and was thus not solely to blame for the country's bad situation. He ruled out a change of premier soon, unless it proved indispensable, because "there are too many other problems to resolve". But he also dropped a hint once more that were there to be a shakeup, it was a "possibility" that he might take the prime minister's post himself to extricate Poland from its political crisis.

Walesa Examines Danger of Russian Famine
LD2701173692 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1615 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] President Lech Walesa discussed the situation in the east in today's RZECZPOSPOLITA. I am the first politician for a long time, Lech Walesa said, to tell all concerned what you and others were afraid to print, that the only solution for the Soviet Union was for it to collapse as quickly as possible and unite again, but on different terms. The more delayed that process, the greater the danger for Poland, for Europe and the world. This maneuver was carried out quite late. As a result, various dangers have accumulated, first and foremost economic, which could lead to a great famine on the other side of the eastern border, and that famine will cause a wandering of people, and we will have to cope with certain things that could happen. Poland is not ready to take in tens of millions of people. We quite simply cannot cope with this problem. Poland will have to admit hungry women and children, but we have not got enough planes, too few possibilities to transport these people to other countries.

'Soviet' Oil Deliveries Resume; Gas Shortage
LD2701215292 Warsaw PAP in English 1622 GMT
 27 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 27—As many as 80,000 tonnes of oil from the former Soviet republics were sent to the refinery in Plock, northwest Poland, on Monday [27 January] after a break since January 13. The Plock refinery was to have received 300,000 tonnes of Russian oil this month, but by January 13 it got only 130,000 tonnes, Czeslaw Dolasinski, general director of the refinery told PAP.

Apart from the 130,000 tonnes already delivered in January and the 80,000 sent today the Russian side promised to supply Poland with another 70,000 tonnes still this month, deputy director of the oil pipelines enterprises Grzegorz Mojzesowicz said. Soviet oil deliveries have been stored in the Adamow tanks situated near the Belarus border all the time since January 13, but only now the Russians indicated which country it is to go to. The same tanks are used by the Plock refinery and the German Schwedt complex, Mojzesowicz explained.

Meanwhile, Poland continues to receive less than 60 percent of gas supplies agreed with the former Soviet states

for this year. This means that big Polish industrial and chemical plants get less gas than they need to keep their production going. No limits have been introduced yet in supplying Polish flats with cooking gas, gas authorities say.

Lithuania Rejects Mar Elections in Districts

LD2501000292 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1830 GMT 24 Jan 92

[Text] The Lithuanian Supreme Council has rejected the draft proposal of the Polish faction in that parliament for elections to the regional councils in Vilnius and Salcininkai—that were dissolved in September—to take place in March. The decision on their dissolution was made by the authorities in Vilnius, after the failed attempt at a coup d'etat in the Soviet Union. The Poles were then accused of supporting the leaders of the putsch. In March half a year will have passed since the introduction of plenipotentiary rule in these regions—and it was introduced for precisely that period of time.

[Unidentified correspondent] The parliament adopted, as the basis for discussion about the situation in the Vilnius region, the report by the commission chaired by Eugenius Petrovas examining the activity of the dissolved councils. The Petrovas commission proposes that a debate on the date of elections to these councils be undertaken in March.

In the name of the Polish faction and of the main board of the Union of Poles in Lithuania, Zbigniew Balcewicz presented a statement in which the representatives of the Polish minority demand the implementation of the resolutions of the Supreme Council of Lithuania from January of last year. At that time the parliament obliged the executive authorities to, within the framework of the new administrative division of the country, create a Vilnius District within the borders of the Vilnius and Salcininkai Regions. The revised law on minorities envisages the opportunity to use one's mother tongue as the administrative language in regions with a dense concentration of minorities. The resolutions adopted by the parliament of Lithuania have in practice been wasted, write the authors of the statement.

Environmental Agreement Signed With Lithuania

LD2401172592 Warsaw PAP in English 1705 GMT
24 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 24—Poland and Lithuania on Friday [24 January] signed an agreement on cooperation in the protection of natural environment.

The document, signed by Polish and Lithuanian Environment Protection Ministers Stefan Kozlowski and Evaldas Vebra, embraces such fields as monitoring of natural environment and protection of border water resources as well as legal and economic aspects linked with the protection of natural environment.

During a press conference held after the signing ceremony, Minister Kozlowski said that training of Lithuanian experts in Poland will be one of the forms of Poland's assistance to the Lithuanian side, adding also that his ministry decided to convey to Lithuania 100 million zloties (just below 10 thousand dollars).

"This gesture of sincerity should contribute to the renewal of traditional contacts between our countries", said Minister Kozlowski.

Lithuanian Minister Evaldas Vebra stressed during the conference that Lithuanian forests had been destroyed by the Soviet Army and by industry producing chiefly for the needs of the former Soviet Union.

Skubiszewski Satisfied With Washington Conference

LD2401230992 Warsaw PAP in English 2207 GMT
24 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 24—Poland's Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski returning from the Washington conference on assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union, said on Friday [24 January] that participants in the forum assessed Poland and the remaining two countries of the "triangle", Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as fully capable of using their potential in the process of granting aid to the East.

During the conference, the three states issued a joint declaration in which they presented a plan of "triangle assistance" programme to consist in the financing by the West of the supplies of goods and services from the three countries to the 12 new independent states.

Minister Skubiszewski opined that if Poland and the remaining countries of the "triangle" join the aid programme "profits will be beneficial for both sides: states on the territories of the former Soviet Union will receive aid, while purchases made in our region will be beneficial for us."

The Polish minister added that the scale of aid offered at the moment is not sufficient "in respect to the needs or to the area."

Poland is ready to sell rye, fruit, vegetables and other farm produce as part of the "triangle assistance" programme for a total of 500 million dollars, and medicines and staple foods for another 500 million dollars, according to sources at Poland's Foreign Economic Relations Ministry.

Walesa Blames Failures on 'Polish Romanticism'

LD2401165892 Warsaw PAP in English 1606 GMT
24 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 24—President Lech Walesa told the deputies of the Liberal Democratic Congress and the Polish Economic Programme during a meeting in the parliament on Friday [24 January] that he had "done

1000 per cent of work" to help bring Poland to normality and blamed Polish romanticism for errors and unsatisfactory effects of the undertaken transformations.

"In the time of struggle it seemed that when democracy comes everything else must turn out well but it appears that we have not been sufficiently prepared for it," the president said.

Walesa also stressed that by submitting draft constitutional amendments some time ago he wanted to provoke others into action. He pointed out that the government should request special powers for the Interior Ministry and the prosecutor's office to counteract various economic scandals and to carry out reprivatization and privatization. "Now, you are to create law which will result in the formulation of a constitution" the president told the deputies adding that he was "leaving it for their wisdom to choose the manner in which the constitution would be adopted."

Emerging from the meeting with liberal deputies Lech Walesa told journalists that Poland needed a broad pro-reformatory coalition and that the president's role was to see to it that further steps undertaken in Poland be wiser and more effective and able to "elevate Polish attainments to higher stages".

Walesa 'Ready To Resign If It Helps'

LD2401202592 Warsaw PAP in English 1820 GMT
24 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 24—"I am ready to resign if it helps since I am dissatisfied with myself but not because I have not tried," President Lech Walesa said at a meeting with representatives of Solidarity factory commissions at the Warszawa steelworks here on Friday [24 January].

The president stated that the current bad situation in the country resulted from the incompetiveness of the industry built according to ideological and not economic criteria, the collapse of traditional markets for Polish goods and too "romantic" opening to the West which flooded Poland with its products.

In reply to charges that—despite assurances of the necessity to form a government of experts—the government was formed according to party affiliation, Walesa said: "The government was formed by a person selected by democracy. I could not change anything. I am expected to be a dictator and told to build democracy."

Asked about a meeting with former Solidarity Premiers Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki on Thursday [23 January] and his intention to have them as advisers, the president replied: "I am looking for agreement with a view to maximally squeezing out all that is good for Poland."

Walesa Does Not Foresee 'Black Scenario'

LD2701204792 Warsaw PAP in English 1922 GMT
27 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 27—President Lech Walesa said in an interview for a Catholic weekly published Monday [27 January] that he does not foresee any "black scenario" for Poland "provided that no one meddles and our nerves can stand it."

Speaking to the Krakow-based TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY Walesa said that in his view "social consciousness and awareness of the Polish society is still considerable, but there is a need for a fluent passage of wise people and wise programme."

Asked whether he would form a presidential party Walesa said that if pluralism fails to prevail and fragmentation of the political scene persists, he would form something to make a balance and raise the Polish democracy onto a higher level. "I must be prepared for many options," Walesa declared.

Walesa was positive about the need to punish those who engineered the 1981 martial law in Poland, which act he termed as "the greatest crime committed on Poland's organism."

As the president, he does not feel discouraged because he feels he scores successes anyway. He admitted that he tried to hamper the creation of the cabinet of Prime Minister Olszewski as long as he hoped for creating a broader basis for the new government. "My activities, therefore, were aimed at promoting a stronger government and not hampering its formation," Walesa claimed.

Spokesman Criticizes Treatment by Press

LD2401173392 Warsaw PAP in English 1341 GMT
23 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—Government press spokesman Marcin Gugulski complained on Thursday [23 January] that "unlike any other Polish Government over the past 1,000 years, this government met with devastating, massive criticism at the very start." Speaking bitterly about journalists in an interview for the "GLOB 24" daily he said he will more eagerly cooperate with honest journalists than with gangsters specializing in slander and rumours.

"We do not prevent anyone from having access to information but we will not talk very eagerly to journalistic gangsters," Gugulski told the daily but refused to say whom he considered as "gangsters."

Gugulski announced he will not organize large press conferences with the spokesman playing the role of a star because he feels "neither competent enough nor has got such ambitions."

Government Skips Meeting With Solidarity in Lodz

LD2401213392 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 2100 GMT 24 Jan 92

[Text] Only trade unionists turned up at a meeting announced by Marian Krzaklewski between government representatives and Solidarity trade unionists, which was to have taken place in Lodz. They accused Minister Jerzy Kropiwnicki of blocking negotiations on the demands of hunger strike participants. The possibility of a radicalization of demands was announced. This will be decided tomorrow by the presidium of the secretariat of the solidarity of Light Industry, whose meeting will take place with the participation of all regional sectors of this branch. In view of the situation, Marian Krzaklewski, the Solidarity leader, announced his immediate arrival in Lodz. His arrival is expected after 1100 GMT, the hunger strikers' spokesman informed.

KLD To Cooperate in Economic Reforms Protection

LD2401134892 Warsaw PAP in English 2135 GMT
24 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—The Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), the party of former Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, will cooperate with the government to protect Poland's economic reforms.

Premier Jan Olszewski announced at his meeting with a delegation from the KLD that he was ready to cooperate with all responsible political groupings.

Leader of the KLD, Donald Tusk, said afterwards that this was "the first sign that people of good will would be able to talk about Poland in a common language". The most important thing for the Liberals, according to Tusk, was maintaining the direction of reforms. "The Liberals have not come today with a proposition to reconstruct the government", he said, explaining that since there was a need for a stable government, his party would take care with its political activity so as to avoid possible areas of conflict.

Tusk thought that by cooperating with the government the KLD would be able to "constructively support the process of reform", but denied that this was a question of political cooperation.

For the government, spokesman Marcin Gugulski said that the meeting with the KLD was the last in the cycle between the prime minister and significant parliamentary floor groups. Commenting on recent criticism of the government Gugulski said, "both the press and politicians should take care to make a harmonious connection between freedom of speech and the responsibility" that went with it.

Hunger Strikers, Government Discuss New Timeframe

LD2401135392 Warsaw PAP in English 2253 GMT
23 Jan 92

[Text] Lodz, Jan. 23—Senate Speaker August Chelkowski accepted the proposal of hunger strikers from Lodz (central Poland) textile factory and agreed to be responsible for a timetable of negotiations between the Solidarity Trade Union of the light industry and the government representatives. On the side of Solidarity, similar responsibility will be assumed by its chairman Marian Krzaklewski.

A document containing new proposals concerning the timetable of negotiations was presented by the Ministry of Trade and Industry on Thursday [23 January] but it disappointed the trade unionists who decided to continue the strike.

What is written in the document is not a new schedule of negotiations but an explanation to the schedule, which we had received from the Ministry of Industry on January 20 and were dissatisfied with as it disregarded the nationwide character of our demands and the essence of what we postulated.

What we want are quick negotiations aimed at working out of a strategy for the entire light industry, changes in taxation and credit policies, pension law flexibility, easing the unemployment and defining the manner of privatization, said Solidarity representatives. They also stressed that they would be waiting for a new negotiations schedule the draft of which had been presented to the ministry on January 21.

A total of 15 workers participates in the hunger strike in Lodz. Five people were taken to hospital.

Ownership Changes Council Discusses Privatization

LD2401173292 Warsaw PAP in English 2040 GMT
23 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 23—The Council for Ownership Changes Thursday discussed the process of capital privatization last year and said that the summing up by the Ministry for Privatization showed that the state budget increased by 2.5 trillion zlotys (about 227 million dollars) in virtue of capital privatization.

Privatization started from the sale of five enterprises at the turn of 1990/1991 and a total of eleven enterprises were sold on public offer in 1991. Besides, eighteen deals of selling big packages of shares to Polish and foreign investors were concluded.

The privatization process turned out to be very difficult as the ministry points chiefly to public reluctance and distrust in changes, particularly these involving the share of foreign capital.

Members of the council stressed that capital privatization was neither the main nor universal method of privatizing the Polish economy primarily because there

is the absence of domestic capital. Foreign investors are discouraged by the deteriorating condition of Polish enterprises, the lack of infrastructure, unclear legislation and unstable political situation. Neither does public conviction about corruption and the sell-out of national property dirt-cheap, accompanying privatization, foster the quest undertaken by foreign investors.

Under these circumstances, privatization undisputably resulted in setting up stock market - its basic institutions and the law regulating the turnover of securities, members of the council said.

TV Industry Financial Difficulties Reported

*LD2401183192 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1615 GMT 23 Jan 92*

[Text] There have been talks going for some years about the television being in a mess, but that used to be only a

rumor supported by a reliable source. A report by the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK] proves that these were not merely slanderous remarks. During the last ten years, the television was run by eight chairmen. According to NIK inspectors, four of them implemented organizational changes which made it impossible to establish the real financial condition of the institution. Being neither a state enterprise nor a budgetary unit, the television could not have been put in the state of liquidation. By making such a decision, Chairman Terlecki transgressed his powers. Losses caused by unsettled bills for screening commercials amount to 34 billion zloty. There was no penalty payment added to invoices for delayed settlements. Television advertisement office continued paying commissions to firms being its debtors. The Committee for Radio and Television participated in nine stock or limited liability companies. This venture was unprofitable, NIK report says.

Iliescu, Snegur Begin Official Talks at Ungheni

AU2501162192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1316 GMT 25 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 25/1/1992—Romania and Moldova's president, Ion Iliescu and Mircea Snegur started official talks Saturday, 25 January, at Ungheni, on the border between Romania and Moldova.

Accompanying President Iliescu from the Romanian side are Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, Trade and Tourism Secretary of State Napoleon Pop, National Bank Governor Mugur Isarescu, other top officials.

Upon crossing the border, President Iliescu was met by Moldova's Foreign Minister Nicolae Tiu, who gave the Romanian delegation a welcoming address.

The talks have focused the interest of Romanian, Moldovan and foreign media, present on site.

Iliescu Assesses Bulgaria Visit Positively

AU2701193992 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1920 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 27/1/1992—In his address after signing the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration and Good Neighbourliness between Romania and Bulgarian (in Sofia on January 27), President Ion Iliescu assessed that that was an important moment of special significance in the evolution of the Romanian-Bulgarian ties. The treaty is an expression of the mutual wish to set bilateral relations on new bases, in accordance with the deep-going changes in the two countries, President Iliescu said, adding that the treaty provided the principal legal framework for a broad cooperation between the two countries. He expressed his satisfaction at the talks with President Zhelyu Zhelev, considering that they would help amplify and intensify bilateral ties.

Back to Bucharest the same day in the evening, President Ion Iliescu showed in a statement he made at Otopeni Airport that the interview in Sofia was useful and put the bases for a new opening in bilateral relations. On the one hand, it marks the closing of a process that developed in the last two years, with moments of deadlock, of sensitivity, susceptibility, and restraints linked to the internal situation in Romania and Bulgaria. On the other hand, it is a proof of the very good, very open atmosphere noticed in Sofia, opined President Iliescu.

No Obstacle Seen to Membership in Europe Council

AU2701193692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1935 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/1/1992—Senate Deputy Speaker Vasile Mois presented Monday [27 January] before the senate's plenum an account of the Romanian parliamentary delegation's activity in Paris on January 23 and 24 when they attended two meetings of the Commission for

European Relations with the Non-Member Countries and of the Political Commission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Mois also read statements, particularly favourable for Romania, made by personalities of the commissions under the Council of Europe, specifying that there were no more obstacles to Romania's way toward being granted the status of full member of the Council of Europe.

Approaching another subject, Mr. Vasile Mois called the parliamentarians' attention to the anti-Romanian activities of the International Foundation "Transilvania" and the Association "Transilvania" based in Budapest, underscoring that nobody had the right to question the unity, sovereignty and independence of Romania.

Roman Discusses Economic Recovery Program

AU2701203492 Bucharest AZI in Romanian
18 Jan 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Petre Roman, national leader of the National Salvation Front, by Octavian Stireanu; place and date not given: "It Will Be a National Project of Hope"]

[Excerpts] [Stireanu] Mr. Roman, can you tell us something about the significance and tangible results of your meetings in France and Spain?

[Roman] Two meetings are significant and of particular importance for the National Salvation Front as a political party with its well-known center-left orientation: the meeting in Paris with the first secretary of the French Socialist Party, Roland Fabius, who was very recently appointed to this position, and the meeting with the prime minister and leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, Felipe Gonzalez.

During the meeting with Mr. Fabius we discussed a subject regarding the way the French Socialist Party formulates its political orientation within the framework of the changes that have occurred in France and in Europe in general. Obviously, I paid attention to the correlation with the structural changes and transformations in Eastern Europe. [passage omitted]

We also concretely discussed relations between the two parties. The French Socialist Party intends to send a mission to Romania to establish tangible points of information and to possibly establish constant relations. [passage omitted]

My discussion with Felipe Gonzalez was much longer, determined also by the fact that we have very close relations. [passage omitted]

The Spanish Socialist Workers Party is also prepared to support the orientation and current transformation of the National Salvation Front into a clearly democratic party that wants to achieve democracy in Romania. [passage omitted]

We will maintain relations and build concrete bridges of relations with the Socialist Workers Party of Spain, too.

[Stireanu] In connection with what you said before regarding the changes within the French Socialist Party, I would like to ask what is the stage of formulating the Front's program?

[Roman] This program of the Front has to be a national project. This national project is needed so that there is hope, as I have stressed before. It represents the national project of hope that can exist and that captures the minds and hearts of people, because it incorporates a tangible program in which improvements and a turn for the better will eventually be obvious. This is the project on which we are working. It means strong support for the economy correlated with the social dimension in a form that will justify this project from the point of view of what is called a political program, that is a national project of hope. [passage omitted] More than ever before, this is what the Romanian society needs, just like after a disaster, because this is the truth: We have inherited a disaster. Thus, more than ever before, the Romanian society needs a tangible program.

[Stireanu] This program will probably be tested for the first time at the Front's national convention (I do not know whether "tested" is the right word!) before the general elections.

[Roman] This program—as well as others, should they emerge—are to be discussed, first and foremost, within the various bodies and organizations of the Front. We are convinced that we will present it to the country, and eventually it should be clearly accepted by the largest possible number of citizens and specialists. Rather than test it, the convention has to adopt it, so that it may indeed become a government program should the extraordinary situation arise that the elections—including future ones—are won, in a sufficient proportion, by the National Salvation Front. [passage omitted]

[Stireanu] Do you anticipate that this convention will launch what would be termed "alternative motions," "alternative political motions?"

[Roman] That is possible. [passage omitted] I am of the opinion that—I repeat—what we need is a project, so that there is concrete hope.

[Stireanu] You mean a government program rather than....

[Roman] Undoubtedly, I am talking about a government program. That is clear! [passage omitted]

Let us not forget that the world economy is going through a recession. [passage omitted] Despite this, if we bear in mind the readiness and need of the international economic community to integrate—as soon as possible—the Romanian economy, which is operating on the same principles of a free economy and market then—seen from this angle—conditions are favorable indeed.

Fota Details 1991 Export, Import Statistics

AU2701165292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1547 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 27/1/1992—Romania's exports in hard currency totalled 3,520 million dollars in 1991, which compares with 3,503 million dollars in 1990, a growth of 0.8 percent having been registered, said Mr. Constantin Fota, minister of trade and tourism, at his weekly news conference.

Exports in hard currency in December 1991 stood at 517 million dollars, a 46-percent rise over November. The same year exchanges on a clearing-ruble basis dropped substantially, exports on this basis accounting for only 31 percent of the level of 1990. Exports as a whole were not subsidized.

Furthermore, the trade minister said, the weight of the private sector in the achievement of the export volume rose to 19 percent. Owing to the steps towards a reform in the structure of exports the efficient branches of the Romanian economy are now apparent—sectors in machine building whose exports in hard currency increased in 1990 as to 1990: Tractors, cars, refrigerators, furniture, cement, glassware, readymades, footwear, electric engines.

As for imports, Mr. Fota said, the overall figure of 1991 is of 4,750 million dollars, accounting for 90.9 percent of the level of 1990. In this case, too, imports on a clearing-ruble basis dropped, the volume of 1991 representing only 13 percent of the 1990 level.

A roughly 50-percent weight in the structure of imports is held by such products as energy products and the other basic raw materials for production which are financed from the state centralized fund, according to an agreement with the IMF.

The trade balance, when comparing FOB exports with FOB imports, shows the following balances: 269 million in transferable rubles, which compares with a passive balance of 1,738 million at the end of 1990, and a passive balance on 1,230 million dollars which compares with 1,720 at the end of 1990.

Senate Endorses Report on SRI Draft Law

AU2801092892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0840 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/1/1992—With 61 votes for, seven against and five abstentions, Romania's Senate passed on 27 January the report of the Mediation Commission on the draft law on the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] organization and operation, which will now be sent to the president of Romania for promulgation.

Discussions were resumed on the draft law for the sale of state-owned housing and other buildings. The only point on which all senators were agreed was that families who already own a home cannot buy another in installments

from the state. Speaking during question time, Ioan Rus of Alba referred to the activity of the Parliamentary Commission due to supervise the radio and television campaign for the upcoming local elections: "In my opinion this commission was set up illegally and has operated outside the law, in open violation of the provisions of the recent constitution of Romania, and of the rules of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies". The senator urged a suspension of the commission and called the two chambers' standing bureaus to account before the two chambers.

PDAR Condemns Anti-Iliescu, Snegur Remarks

AU2501191392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1809 GMT 25 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 25/1/1992—The press office of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR] shows in a communique on the convention of the National Union Council held in Iasi that the representatives of the Agrarian Party took part in that event inspired by best feelings of solidarity with the movement taking place in Romania and in the Republic of Moldova for the reunification of the country and not the union in Iasi between Romania and the occupied territories. The party thought that on that holy day of the Romanians everywhere, January 24, that event that focused the attention of public opinion was not a place to express political adversities and in no way to display reprovable attitudes. The communique refers to the fact that a group of turbulent people, led mainly by Ticu Dumitrescu and Dumitru Dinca, reprimanded Petre Roman and asked him to stop speaking, chanted slogans against the presidents of Romania and the Republic of Moldova and prevented other speakers from taking the floor.

Democratic Convention, PAC Hold Bucharest Rally

AU2301164792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1215 GMT 25 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 25/1/1992—Over 3,000 people attended a rally staged by the Democratic Convention and the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] the Revolution

Square in Bucharest, under the motto "The key to success of Romanians everywhere", to mark the 133d anniversary of the union of the Romanian principalities, but also campaigning for the forthcoming local elections of 9 February, for which the convention has chosen a key as its emblem.

Civic Alliance leaders and candidates to the local administration, running on a Democratic Convention ticket, recalled the significance of the 24 January 1859 union and "the right of the Romanian people to regain its full unity, freedom and democracy."

Official Estimates Enough Uranium for 30 Years

AU2701150792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1411 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 27/1/1992—Surprisingly Romania contributes 35 per cent to the nuclear programme and just 25 per cent to the conventional programme; the vice-president of the National Electricity Company RENEL, Tiberiu Campureanu, told a news conference in reference to the nuclear power station at Cernavoda. The eleven Romanian commercial companies involved at Cernavoda may operate also on foreign markets in future having passed this test of nuclear materials and equipment reliability. The total number of Romanian enterprises contributing to the nuclear power programme is 250.

Heavy water is to be made in this country as is the nuclear fuel, and we have enough uranium for thirty years' operation, Mr. Campureanu added.

Remedial operations dated back to 1990 and put at 2.5 billion lei were also discussed. The money comes from the investment fund, not from auction which would have entailed "disadvantages" as Mr. Campureanu said.

Payoff time is expected to take 12 years, with one kilowatt supplied by the station being estimated at 6.1 lei, in line with current prices, it was also said.

International**Gligorov Asks Canada To Grant Recognition***LD2801100292 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0631 GMT 28 Jan 92*

[Text] Ottawa, January 28 (TANJUG)—Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia, southeast Yugoslavia, has asked from Canada to formally recognize it [as received]. Monday evening, Gligorov had a talk with Canada's premier Brian Mulroney, here.

His talk with Mulroney over, the Macedonian president said that Canada is ready to help with having the said Yugoslav republic recognized, adding, "Yugoslavia does not exist."

He is going to raise the question of recognizing Macedonia's independence at his government's next session, the Canadian premier said.

Slovenia's Peterle Meets Kohl, Briefs Media*LD2701204192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1556 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Text] Bonn, 27 Jan (TANJUG)—Slovenian Prime Minister Lojze Peterle today held talks in Bonn with Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the economic situation in Slovenia and on Slovenian-German cooperation. He also thanked Kohl and his government for supporting the international recognition of Slovenia.

At an afternoon news conference, Peterle declared that relations between Slovenia and Germany were friendly, cooperative and correct. According to him, Slovenia currently requires about 300 million deutsch marks for the technological development of its export industry and about 200 million marks for the infrastructure development. Other projects also require foreign capital, but Peterle emphasized that this capital is not expected from Germany alone. Peterle said relations between the Yugoslav republics are affected by the consequences of war. He termed relations between Slovenia and Croatia as good. He expressed the wish for the normalization of relations with other republics.

Peterle believes a kind of "new Yugoslavia", as a union of sovereign states, was possible, but "on condition that the hatred which provoked the war disappears" and if the new integration is based on democratization and European standards, in all republics. He does not see this as "a short-term possibility."

He considers the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be critical. He emphasized that solutions there can be achieved only by consensus, not by majority decisions. It is difficult to think of a peaceful solution considering that Muslims and Croats favor a referendum on independence while Serbs oppose it, Peterle said.

Peterle said Slovenia wants "a peaceful solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina with which all three peoples would

be satisfied," but added that he was not optimistic "because there is too much tension there, and arms as well."

Interrepublic**No Agreement at Meeting on Airspace Issue***LD2701203792 Budapest MTI in English
2002 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Text] Budapest, January 27 (MTI)—Differences of opinion prevented any agreement at an international aviation conference today on opening the airspace of Croatia and Slovenia.

Participating at the conference were transport authorities from Croatia, Slovenia and the federal government of Yugoslavia. Also at the meeting were the international aviation organizations IATA, ICAO and the European organization of air traffic security Eurocontrol.

Despite the lack of an agreement, the conference cannot be termed a failure, according to Yugoslavia's Federal Transport Ministry representative Mirko Ivkovic, conference chairman, who said it is an achievement in itself all sides could assert their positions, in accord with the new situation in Yugoslavia and the world.

The air quarantine, paralyzing half of Yugoslavia's airspace is damaging all sides, participants agreed, concluding a solution will have to quickly be found for the secure reopening of international transit corridors, internal air routes and airports.

Nevertheless, there seem to be irreconcilable differences about who should control the airspace and from where it should be controlled. According to federal authorities, air traffic over the territory of the former Yugoslavia should be controlled by the Belgrade centre. In the opposing view, however, a regional control centre should be established in Zagreb.

The Croat proposals will be forwarded to the federal government, and the possibility of calling another meeting will be examined, Ivkovic said.

Federal**Kostic on Troop Removal When UN Forces Arrive***LD2801044192 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0318 GMT 28 Jan 92*

[Text] Belgrade, January 27 (TANJUG)—Just now, there is no (?possibility) for Yugoslav Army troops to return from warring areas in Croatia, Branko Kostic, vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, said today.

When the U.N. peace-keeping force comes, there will be no longer needed to engage them, Kostic told the parents

of recruits serving their military terms who asked that their sons be moved out of the civil war-stricken areas and be replaced by reservists.

Underway is an intensive action to get engaged a U.N. peace-keeping force to take over the role of protecting Serbs living "within the administrative borders" of the breaking-away Republic of Croatia, Kostic explained. By doing so, conditions would be created for a political settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia, Kostic added.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Silajdzic: Bosnia Qualifies for EC Recognition

*AU2601220092 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Jan 92*

[Text] Haris Silajdzic, foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated after his visit to Italy, Hungary, France, and Austria, that his hosts in these countries were convinced Bosnia-Herzegovina is a democratic country. TANJUG correspondent in Sarajevo Bahrija Secerkadic has more details:

[Begin Secerkadic report] My hosts, without exception, stressed that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a democratic country that is maintaining its democratic institutions in very difficult circumstances, that Bosnia-Herzegovina acted constructively in the Yugoslav crisis, at the peace conference, and outside the peace conference, that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a victim of a conflict it did not initiate itself and in which it is not taking part, and that, with regard to what I have already said, Bosnia-Herzegovina meets all the criteria needed to be recognized as an independent state and to take the place it deserves in the world community.

This was stated by Dr. Haris Silajdzic, minister of foreign affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, last night upon his return from his visit to France, Italy, Hungary, and Austria. According to him, the EC is not convinced about the democratic processes in the Yugoslav republics and this is the basic reason for the postponement of recognition. They do not know to what extent we are democratic, Silajdzic said. Regarding the level of democracy, Bosnia-Herzegovina is an exception to a certain degree, because Europe knows that we have perfectly free press, that we do not hold political prisoners, and that we have plans for an open economy.

Silajdzic stressed that the international recognition will end the political and economic exploitation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This will provide a solid and (well-known) basis for the improvement of our internal relations, here in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as for good relations with the states that are surrounding us. We have created a firm paradigm of tolerance and common life that has been in existence for centuries—something Europe is also aware of. With this we have a chance to be ahead of

others in some fields, to be a model of a modern way of living—something Europe is still striving for, Dr. Silajdzic said. [end recording]

Izetbegovic Notes Bosnian Croat Allegiance

*LD2701122792 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1126 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Text] Sarajevo, 27 Jan (TANJUG)—Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic told OSLOBODJENJE today that he believed that, despite the fact that there will be those who will abstain from voting as well as calls for boycott and those who will heed it, the referendum on this republic's independence "will attract at least 60 percent of the citizens who will vote for a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina."

As far as "the cracks" in the Croatian Democratic Community [Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica] are concerned, Izetbegovic maintains that a vast majority of Croats, particularly urban Croats and Serbs, as well as the Catholic Church, still favor an indivisible and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said he did not believe that "factors outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, say, Croatia's leadership, will exert a negative influence on the attitude of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Croats because "following the recognition of Croatia, Tudjman ought to talk about Bosnia-Herzegovina with obligatory statesmanlike caution, for this is what today's Europe expects him and others to do."

"I do not believe that anyone will try to obstruct or deny this referendum as it is the most democratic way of articulating the will of citizens. Given a great deal of international interest and control such a move would be met with very negative reactions and no one needs such embarrassment," Izetbegovic says.

Central Bosnian Croats Start Community in Zenica

*AU2601203792 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Jan 92*

[Text] The members of the communal assemblies who belong to the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], and presidents and members of the HDZ communal committees from Zenica, (?Zepce), Zavidovici, and Maglaj, decided today at 1500 [1400] in the King Tomislav Croatian Hall in Zenica to found a Croatian Community of Central Bosnia [Srednja Bosna].

The Croatian Community of Central Bosnia will respect the democratically-elected authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina for as long as they retain their independence and sovereignty the decree of the Croatian Community Central Bosnia, which has its headquarters in Zenica, states among other things.

Izetbegovic's Bosnian Policy Assessed*92BA0354B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
31 Dec 91 pp 24-25*

[Article by Fahrudin Radoncic: "Can Alija Succeed?"—first paragraph is DANAS headline]

[Text] It is not difficult to assume what the criteria are according to which the Army in Bosnia will "prevent international clashes and disarm paramilitary units," as was agreed.

If one is to judge by the fact that the representative army delegation, with Kadijevic and Adzic at the head, remained at the joint luncheon in the Presidency of the Republic—everything was ready in the Sarajevo House of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] so that, if it comes to a complete political breakup, the generals are dining there—the Army and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina avoided, at least for now, a direct confrontation. The fact that the clash does not suit either side was, it seems, the only point of contact on which, statically discussable, the concept of peace has been built in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Among the local populace, the feigned Kadijevic smile and the belligerently strict character of Adzic were transformed into a real nightmare: Are the generals of Bosnia-Herzegovina bringing war or peace? But, not at all unexpectedly, negotiations by army and civilian authorities in Sarajevo, at the highest possible level, have not resolved for certain the fateful dilemma of the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Concession to the Americans

Nevertheless, while they are showing themselves as soldiers to be aggressively unyielding—Bosnia and Herzegovina are permanently entering the war—the generals showed themselves this time to be negotiators prone to small concessions. Only verbally and on a paper on which, like many earlier ones, despite their signature, they'll step with their own boot? Only the stubborn insistence of Stjepan Kljucic that the military leadership explicitly advise how it recognizes civilian authorities was minimized by Kadijevic under a compromise that "the military authorities will not intervene in political solutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

To those whom the army's behavior taught skepticism, this resembles more a concession to America because of the well-known warning that war should not be imposed on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia than a sincere intention that this actually not be done.

The greatest danger for Bosnia-Herzegovina is in the jointly adopted resolution according to which the Army can disarm paramilitary units on the territory of the republic. That view is a high price that the Bosnian negotiators, aware of all dangers, had to pay and, in that manner, pacified the arrogant army. Because, it is not difficult to assume what the national-military criteria are according to which the army will "prevent international

clashes" and "disarm paramilitary units." For example, the weapons of the TO [Territorial Defense] of Mostar were illegally taken and, by order of General Pavel Strugar, "stored in a safer place" and are already being distributed to the ethnically clean—need it be said Serbian at all—Palas near Sarajevo. In addition, the traumatic question arises whether western Herzegovina can be disarmed without spilling a lot of blood and without total war?

How will the local Croats submit their weapons to a mob of soldiers who openly threaten them with genocide and show their righteousness with the destruction of Croatia? At the same time, while Radovan Karadzic disastrously announces that the time has come to "settle debts from 1941 to western Herzegovina," the army is massively arming Serbian volunteers. Then they attach them, as alleged patriotic forces, to themselves and in that way legalize the paramilitary units. On the other hand, nevertheless, the threatening barrels are turned toward the "paramilitary" Croats and Muslims.

Thus the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina are given a feeling of security and ethnic superiority in the resolution of political questions. It is sufficient to say that, in the areas of the republic where large numbers of army troops are stationed, there have been many murders of Croats and Muslims. Several activists and officials of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] have been cold-bloodedly and treacherously liquidated. Dr. Naim Kadic, chief of the representative group of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], warned his colleague, Dr. Vojislav Maksimovic, on a television broadcast how 11 Muslims were killed in a short time period in Bosnia-Herzegovina out of political impulses, in a location where the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] controls all the power. Political terrorism, with which the army and its intelligence service can, but do not have to, have direct connections, is one of the most effective methods of provoking war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The feeling of local Serbs that the army is "theirs" is only one of the forms of proof that it is recognizably, but in a planned manner, being nationally classified and shaped into a special guarantor of a newly proclaimed "Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Is There Salvation?

The bulky band of soldiers now needs territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of the financiers in the framework of the rest of Yugoslavia. Thus it also seems that in the recent assessments of Milovan Djilas about the army's becoming isolated as the natural position of a desperate person and British commentators "that the West buy this belligerent, powerful, and destructive military unit as soon as possible," its ideological-national rigidity and expertise are being ignored. The sacred defense of Serbian interests—and not just its own current privileges in society—is an additional motive for the army to get involved in the creation of a so-called third Yugoslavia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina has a strategically very important role in this. Not only because of its national structure, of which Serbs account for almost one-third, but also because of its geographical position and natural resources. And for this reason the chances of Izetbegovic's tactics are modest; specifically, completely existentialist security is offered to the Army in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the statement of General Milan Torbica that "Mostar will remain in Yugoslavia and the army will persevere in this" speaks about the kind of fate for which this republic is destined. Karadzic's claim that all areas that have 5 percent Serbian population will join Yugoslavia, and several days ago he explained that this means all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is in the same category.

Events in western Herzegovina and Mostar, a real crisis focus, show that the Army will not choose the methods and that it has decided on insolent intimidation. Provoking the war, as in both Slovenia and Croatia, is now justified here too through propaganda stereotypes about how "troops of Croatian armed forces are supposedly gathering in the Neretva valley and beyond," how "reconnaissance-terrorist troops are present," and how officers are "subjected to constant threats and provocations" and even civilians "are continuously arming themselves." But, instead of army commanders, others are suffering. In just one night, four powerful explosions shook Mostar. The hotel and restaurant of the current HDZ activist and former soccer player Jadranko Topic were blown up, as were the restaurants of another two Croats. A time bomb completely destroyed the personal automobile of the brother of the Minister of Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jerko Doka! Before this, members of the army, although in civilian clothes, beat the vice president of the Mostar government, Marin Topic, Jadranko's brother, by the way. Attacks on well-known citizens of Mostar easily demystify the intentions of the JA [Yugoslav Army] and its adherents to achieve, by threatening the horror of war, their and Karadzic's goal—pushing Bosnia-Herzegovina into a greater Serbia.

Nothing of Division

It is interesting that the ideas, already mentioned so many times, about dividing this republic have become anachronistic just when it seemed that Karadzic, writing off Kljuc, found a solution by turning to Mata Boban, less loyal to Bosnia and president of the Croatian Society Herzeg-Bosna. The reason for their secret meeting was supposedly the political elimination of Kljuc and the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic, territorial cakes.

The official claim by Bosnia-Herzegovina for the recognition of the national independence of this republic made all the speculation about the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina worthless. But, this can also be a negotiating-agreeing deceit, provoking already violent Serbian extremism. An SDS leader let it be known publicly:

"Don't let them fool us that we want to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina because that's not correct. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a part of Yugoslavia and it will remain in Yugoslavia." Karadzic shouted this out and once again emphasized a "Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina."

This type of political maliciousness and blackmail, in a familiar cocktail of worn-out demagoguery, has been offered to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This potion should throw the majority of Serbs in this republic into a national trance and Muslims into despair, and force west Herzegovinian Croats to seek territorial flight into Croatia with which they would finish the job that has been assigned to Karadzic. However, Muslims and Croats have found Karadzic's cocktail to be poison. At the same time, Karadzic has chosen a tactic of seeking all or nothing, with which he has shown all the untenability of his own maximum demands.

Nevertheless, the most recent session in Belgrade, where Branko Kostic was host to the heads of the parties that want the preservation of Yugoslavia, is a new confirmation that the Serbian appetite for a large state wants to achieve its wishes with the literal swallowing up of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with which Belgrade control of the EC attains a rising line. Serbia, Montenegro, the newly proclaimed Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Republic of Krajina have been designated as the constituent parts of a new Serbo-Yugoslavia. There is no need even to mention that its armed force will be the current JNA. Keeping this in mind, on the other hand, knowing the determination of the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina in opposing this caricatural national creation, the in no way coincidental question arises: Why has war in disobedient and intractable Bosnia-Herzegovina not already begun?

The reasons should be sought first of all in the energetic American stand and the placement of European society in the protection of this republic. Knowing the concentration of army weaponry and the weaponry of local Serbs, a non-commissioned officer could carry out the military defeat of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But, looking at it over the long term, an attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina would certainly mean in the end the death sentence for the Army, which would soon become its head in the national sense.

The army's officers are aware of that too. The possible expansion of the war into Bosnia-Herzegovina would be like throwing a glove in the face of the USA and Europe and, by the way, that would mean the complete disclosure of the chauvinistic-imperialist nucleus of Serbia and the Army.

The hope also remains for Bosnia-Herzegovina that the general-warrior Imre Agotic is right when he says that the "drop in morale of the Serbian mob of soldiers for further conquest is evident and I personally think that the military leadership, regardless of its bloodthirstiness, will hardly dare to open still another front." Along with internal weaknesses and combat exhaustion, the Army is

also faced with the risks, which increase rapidly in the case of an attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina, that Europe and the world can take military steps in the energetic tripping up of the Balkan supra-militaristic monster. Sometimes it seems that the fear of all that, and not good sense, has saved this republic up to now from an approach and reasoning by the generals in resolving the Yugoslav drama.

Whether because of this or for other reasons, Kadijevic has just let it be known, on the occasion of the negotiations in Sarajevo, that he has not accepted the call of the SDS for the army to assume power in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the army will not use force in imposing political solutions. This is in collision with what the army is doing all over the republic, but Izetbegovic can be satisfied that Kadijevic has not publicly denied or commented on the request by Bosnia-Herzegovina to the EC for national recognition.

In truth, Kadijevic's "supreme commander," or the truncated presidency of Yugoslavia, has already condemned, through the mouth of the talkative Kostic, the application of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the EC "as an illegal act." It remains to be surmised whether the generals, when the time comes, will obediently bow to such an assessment by their decorative commander and support it with their weapons in a servile manner. But, after everything, the impression remains that the negotiations in Sarajevo have only appeared to reduce antagonisms. There is a lot of mutual distrust. Taking a coldly analytical view, the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina has a small but important advantage: having international support, the leadership has made clear what the future of the republic will be after 15 January.

Uncertainty Remains

As uncertain as this Bosnian-Herzegovinian way and election are, it is equally uncertain what will happen after that date with the Yugoslav army and what it will undertake. It can be heard from some sources how Kadijevic was offered in Sarajevo that all weapons found on the soil of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be transferred to the ownership of this state. Naturally, the existential care of the military cadre would also change into concern for this republic. In this rather improbable variation, Bosnia-Herzegovina could become a small Balkan force. By force of weapons and the number of Serbian officers (!), it would stand at the shoulder of Serbia. But, at least because of the composition of nationalities, it is most probable that the army will not accept the offer mentioned, and this means that it will also reject a democratic, peaceful transformation, which has been offered to it in essence.

The rejection of such initiatives and suggestions—although everything is too late for this kind of JA, it seems—clearly shows that, in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Army will make a definitive choice, after which there is no return in a positive or negative

direction. Courageous political intellects, patience, tolerance, and an inclination to diplomacy are not something to which the generals have oriented themselves. Everything shows how small the chances are that the current Bosnian-army conflict will be converted into a love of convenience. Ozren Kebo, commentator for Sarajevo's VECERNJI LIST, however, claims that it is not impossible at all for the Army to accept that its current forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina will constitute the armed force of this republic in the future. Kebo even claims that the supreme commander of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be at the head of the Presidency with Izetbegovic, the minister of defense would be General Vojislav Djurdjevac, and commissioner of the new government none other than Ante Markovic?!

Colleague Kebo has more chances to be right in retelling the joke that's making the rounds in Sarajevo. Namely, the Sarajevo business district reacted with a joke according to which Alija Izetbegovic, prior to the meeting with the army leadership, expressly forbade Stjepan Kljucic to bring a pipe, because Veljko Kadijevic could respond violently to his intention to light up. Such very possible responses are the greatest danger for this republic.

Croatia

Krajina Serbs' Stand on UN Demarcation Line

LD2801081992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0432 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Knin, January 27 (TANJUG)—The Government of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina firmly sticks to its stand that the U.N. peace-keeping troops "can be deployed only along the conflict line," Lazar Macura, its information minister, said here this evening. "Nobody in the government was against the said stand," Macura told the press the cabinet meeting over.

The Republic of the Serbian Krajina was proclaimed on last December 19 in the Serb-inhabited territories in the seceding Republic of Croatia in response to the Croatian authorities' decision to secede from Yugoslavia. The Krajina Government held its session this evening, after the 1st round of talks between Milan Babic, the Krajina president, and Marrack Goulding, the U.N. undersecretary for peace-keeping operations.

Goulding is in Yugoslavia now so as to submit a report on possibilities for sending blue helmets into Yugoslavia to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Ghali. Their talk over Babic and Goulding told the press that they had made clear their starting positions and stands on the peace plan of Cyrus Vance, the special U.N. emissary for Yugoslavia.

Babic came out in favour, he said himself, of having a contingent of Yugoslav armed forces stay on in the territory of the Krajina even after the arrival of blue helmets. Further, he thinks that the U.N. peace-keeping

troops should be deployed along the delimitation line separating the sides in conflict. The Vance plan provides, however, for the Yugoslav Army troops to withdraw from the Krajina and that blue helmets be deployed in the crisis areas on the "ink spot" principle.

UN Secretary Goulding Arrives in Serbian Krajina
*AU2701161692 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Text] Shortly after midday, UN Under Secretary Marrack Goulding, who is in charge of the UN peace mission, arrived in Knin. He is accompanied by Australian Colonel John Wilson, chief of the UN liaison officers, who also visited Knin last week.

Marrack Goulding met with Dr. Milan Babic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. A news conference was originally scheduled for 2000 hours [1900 GMT] but was later postponed. A news conference, or a short meeting with reporters, will most probably be held between 1500 and 1600 hours.

According to the first reports, which were not confirmed in the Information Service of the Knin Corps Command, at 0930 several projectiles were shot at the positions of the defenders in the village of Velika Glava near Skradin from the positions of the Croatian paramilitary army.

Late last night a transmission line near hamlets of Moric and Zaton above Obrovac was damaged in the explosion of two bombs, therefore, the Obrovac commune is without electricity. The investigation of this sabotage, another in a series of such incidents in this part of Serbian Krajina, is under way.

Meets Babic, Discusses UN Plan

*LD2701194992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1801 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Jan (TANJUG)—President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Milan Babic stated today for Belgrade Radio, following talks with UN Undersecretary Marrack Goulding, that this is the first time the United Nations has considered the Serbian people in Krajina an equal party in the conflict.

In a program called "An Argument More" on Belgrade Radio One, he said that "Goulding came to present a concept which Mr. Cyrus Vance had already drawn up and which has been in circulation, and particularly to explain to us the gist of the concept in relation to remarks that we have made so far."

Babic said that Goulding's attention was drawn to remarks in connection with "certain stands contained in the concept and reasons why we proposed that the peace-keeping forces be deployed in order to separate the warring sides, the forces of the Republic of Croatia and those of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, along the frontline."

Asked whether they approached an agreement and whether Goulding gave some guarantees, Babic replied that the basic remark on Vance's concept was the fact that the territory of Krajina has been treated as a territory within Croatia which will be put under UN protection.

"Goulding explained that the United Nations still considers the state and legal system of Yugoslavia unchanged, which gives rise to a conclusion that the state and legal system of the federal unit which previously existed within Yugoslavia, i.e. Croatia, would be implemented on our territory. Of course, we cannot accept this, because this was the main cause of our armed conflict," Babic stressed.

He added that another essential remark was that there have been some doubts that armed forces of the Republic of Krajina would cause conflicts and the continuation of the war, regardless of the fact that 15 cease-fire agreements have so far been violated by the Croatian side. "On the basis of these doubts, demilitarization of Krajina has been demanded, while at the same time the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia would be left intact," Babic warned.

Goulding tried to remove these doubts, Babic said, by giving guarantees that this would not mean prejudging a political solution. "However, we clearly explained that a state of facts exists established by the recognition of the Republic of Croatia and the setting up of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and that Vance's concept disturbs this state of facts. Peace-keeping forces are to be deployed not only to maintain peace and the cease-fire and prevent the escalation of war, but to carry out the disarmament of Krajina, which means that their deployment in Krajina would disturb the existing state of facts only to our detriment," the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina underlined.

Babic expects Goulding to understand that the state of facts has changed since Vance's plan was drawn up. We, he said in conclusion, "refer to the doctrine of changed circumstances and expect the United Nations to be more flexible and find a way to modify Vance's plan and accept a plan that we are offering."

Comments on Talks With Babic

*LD2801042992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0315 GMT 28 Jan 92*

[Text] Knin, January 27 (TANJUG)—Marrack Goulding, U.N. undersecretary, said last night, after a 2nd round of talks with Milan Babic, president of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, that "Babic is now not in a situation to accept the U.N. plan and agree to cooperate with the troops."

The Cyrus Vance plan contains assurances enough that the Krajina will be protected by the coming peace-keeping force, Goulding told the press, regretting that his arguments about the Krajina being protected when the

U.N. peace-keeping force come have failed to convince Babic of that as well. After full five hours of talks, the negotiators showed cautious optimism, leaving the door open for further talks.

Asked whether this means a definitive decision or the talks will continue, Goulding said that among the Security Council members there is a very strong feeling that the world organization has got to help Yugoslavia, adding to this his conviction that there is still time left for negotiations.

Asked whether the U.N. Security Council will take on January 31 a decision on sending the peace-keeping force in, Goulding said that the Security Council cannot decide this matter unless being sure that all those concerned will cooperate with the U.N. troops.

We would not wish to impose anything on any part of Yugoslavia. For all that the Cyrus Vance plan cannot satisfy either side a hundred per cent, both sides could accept it as an alternative to war continuation, he said.

Milan Babic estimated Marrack Goulding's coming to the [word indistinct] Knin for talks as encouragement and voiced his conviction and hope that the U.N. is indeed going to get engaged in establishing a lasting peace in the area and in finding out a just solution to the political crisis in Yugoslavia.

Babic's objections to the Vance plan consist in its treating the Republic of [words indistinct] meaning a demilitarization of the territory of the Krajina only. He also pointed to circumstances changed by Croatia's having been recognized by the E.C. and other countries, but also by the Krajina's having been proclaimed a republic. Starting from this as a new state of things, Babic asked that the plan be modified, but declined to explain in more detail what modifications would be involved. In Babic's estimate, the Presidency of Yugoslavia and the government of its Republic of Serbia "have shown less than understanding enough of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina's problems and impermissible slowness in granting it recognition."

The U.N. undersecretary, Marrack Goulding, is leaving Knin for Zagreb tomorrow and talks with representatives of the Republic of Croatia.

No 'Major Violations' in Crisis Areas Observed

*LD2701134292 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1259 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 27 (TANJUG)—In most crisis areas in Croatia, no major violations were reported last night and today of the 15th ceasefire agreement signed in Sarajevo on January 3, TANJUG reporters say quoting Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) sources.

With the exception of several sniper shots fired on JNA positions from the direction of Sustjepan, the ceasefire in the Dubrovnik-Herzegovina battlefield is being respected by both sides, reporters were told this morning

at the press centre of the JNA's second operative group for Herzegovina based in Trebinje.

Croatian radio reports "the grossest violation of the ceasefire in the Dubrovnik area by the enemy", who attacked Sustjepan from "a vehicle with an unidentified number of soldiers". According to the radio, whose broadcasts are subject to censorship under a decree of the president of the republic, the action was "planned" and "the attackers received armed support from Stara Mokosica".

The situation was calm on the section of the front between the Sava, the Vuka and the Danube Rivers. The information service of the JNA unit in Sid says that the truce is holding there and that conditions are being created for lasting peace. A meeting of the ceasefire monitoring commission scheduled for tomorrow at the Slavonia Hotel in Vinkovci, which is also to be attended by European Community observers, will further consolidate the ceasefire in the area, the service adds. This is the fourth day without incidents in the area of Baranja, TANJUG learns at the headquarters of the Baranja territorial defence. According to Croatian Radio, last night was also calm in the Posavina, Pokuplje and Banija regions. The same source adds that there were no ceasefire violations in the Gospic and Karlovac areas either.

Tomac: No Change to Minority Rights Law

*LD2701122492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1041 GMT 27 Jan 92*

[Text] Zagreb, 27 Jan (TANJUG)—Zdravko Tomac, vice president of the Croatian Government, told DANAS (TODAY) weekly that Croatia "has no need" to change its law on minorities "because it is in accordance with The Hague convention." He added that he was aware of the criticism that "the constitutional law has reduced the right of minorities to the level of municipalities and that this was not enough," but he explained that "under the war conditions it is impossible to change the system."

When the weekly pointed out that President Tudjman promised that the law would incorporate what the Arbitration Commission suggested, Tomac said "what the Arbitration Commission suggested has already been incorporated in the law." Asked whether he expects the European Community to react negatively, Tomac said: "No, some interpret the views of Badinter's commission wrongly. The commission does not say that the law ought to be changed, but that it ought to be applied." Tomac stressed: "At the present, we think that we have reached the optimum with this law and we do not intend to move a step forward."

Croatian Law on Information May Be Revised

*92BA0374B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
31 Dec 91 pp 30-31*

[Article by Gojko Marinkovic: "Trouble With the Truth"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Judging at least from the reactions of journalists, experts, and political parties, the third version of the law on information too will have to be fundamentally revised.

Sometime in mid-July (how long ago that seems!), then Minister of Information Hrvoje Hitrec decided, even though the war was well under way, to devote a little time to his "regular" activities as well. At that time, 10 journalists and experts in the field of media gathered in his office to complete work on the draft Law on the Press, which was supposed to be introduced in the Assembly for the regular action before long. Even though the minister was not inclined to accept the opinion that instead of three laws (on the press, television, and radio), only one uniform law should be adopted, for which Dr. Mario Plenkovic proposed a name—the Law on Mass Media—the participants in that working meeting were satisfied when they left. Minister (now ex-minister) Hitrec accepted nearly all the journalists' basic comments, while one source of particular delight was the fact that he agreed without hesitation that the draft law should be supplemented by positions from European documents, which the Assembly had already accepted in May. He also agreed to the proposal that a Council for Protection of Freedom of the Press be established, which would act as a nongovernmental and nonpartisan institution. At that time, this was in fact a crucial turning point in thinking concerning the "information system," because the documents of the Council of Europe on freedom of expression and of information included recommendations such as:

- It is the obligation of the state to stimulate the diversity of the media and the plurality of information services;
- The independence of the mass media must be protected against the threat of a monopoly;
- Private companies, as well as financial groups, may not establish a monopoly in the area of the press, radio, and television, and monopolies under government control must be resisted.

Translated to our circumstances, this would mean that the state would be the one that would guarantee pluralism in the press, radio, and television, and that it would even financially support the mouthpieces of various national, social, political, and societal groups, parties, and movements. Specifically, information too is first of all a commodity, but the market cannot be the only control guaranteeing the equality of all citizens in the area of information services. Naturally, an additional problem that emerges here is that of money, as well as criteria, but incorporating something like this into a law is tantamount to revolution; as if, say, the old law (which is still "in force" since the law does not recognize an interregnum) had stipulated that the state provide financial support to the religious and "dissident" press.

Surprise

All this was a pie in the sky, however. In the meantime, Hitrec has left the ministry of truth, and he was probably

aware that his mandate was nearing its end even while accepting things that will not please certain people. Because how in the world could the state finance its "enemies" when up to that point it had done so much to muzzle them?

The new minister, Dr. Branko Salaj, who flew in from Sweden to accept his new post, and who according to his own admission was involved in journalism as a young man when he wrote brief sports reports, declared immediately after taking office at the end of the summer that the law was good (even though he had not yet read it through) and that, as far as he knew, it had already been introduced in the Assembly. But then came the surprise.

On 19 December, the Croatian Journalists Society was invited to send its representatives to the minister's office the very next day. The subject of the meeting: a draft proposal for a law on the press and other media. The minister and his coworkers gave two hours of their time to the journalists, and then they discussed the same subject with representatives of parties. The surprise was twofold. First, we all thought that the law, together with the comments, especially the European-oriented ones, had long since made it to the Assembly. And second, the government had suddenly changed its mind and accepted the drawing up of one uniform law, instead of three, pertaining to information. Of course, this does not mean that it will not be necessary to adopt at least two other laws—one on Croatian radio and television and on assigning radio and television frequencies. But what was even more amazing about all this was the fact that the Ministry asked both the journalists organization and the political parties to submit their written comments by the end of the year, and thus by no later than Tuesday. The law sat in a drawer for months, and now all of a sudden it is urgent. Is Europe rushing us along on this once again? And if so, why adopt a bad law and then remedy it?

Because, as Miko Tripalo, a member of the HNS [Croatian People's Party] leadership, says, "This bill constitutes a typical example of a bureaucratic approach to regulating such an important question for any democratic society. Freedom of expression and information," says Tripalo, "is an essential element of genuine democracy. The law should provide maximum protection for civil liberties and a mechanism for guaranteeing them, and prohibit censorship, any sort of state control, and a monopoly on anyone's part. These liberties should be placed under the protection of the courts, not the executive branch. Since the formation of public opinion depends on the stimulation of pluralism and the independence of the press, it is essential to provide the means for such stimulation as well. Aside from a few extremely superficial declarations, the law contains none of this. But at the same time, measures pertaining to compensation for material damages and the right to remedy are specified in detail. With regard to past practice, however, the bureaucratic authorities and their standard bearers are more interested here in protecting themselves from so-called nonconstructive criticism."

New Verbal Offense

"But too often, that practice has been undemocratic: The transformation of many, predominantly local, newspapers and radio stations into public enterprises, with the possibility of influencing personnel and editorial policy, the decree by the president of the republic on information under wartime conditions, which extends censorship to areas not connected to the battlefield, and statements on the need to introduce a ministry of truth are all reminiscent of Orwell's *1984*. I think that the proposed text should be rejected, because it is undemocratic and because it does not restrict government infringement upon the freedom of public communication. The Croatian democracy does not need yet another decorative law," Tripalo said.

Also critical of the draft law is Silvije Degen, the well-known Zagreb attorney and member of the leadership of the Socialist Party of Croatia, who warns that the Croatian Constitution explicitly (Article 38) prohibits censorship and restrictions on a free press, while in Article 101 it then permits the president of the republic to issue decrees with legal force and to undertake extraordinary measures in the event of a state of war or an immediate threat to the state. Degen believes that decrees with legal force, which essentially constitute censorship, and especially the reintroduction of the offense "defamation of the state" or the verbal offense, are a sign of misuse of the law, which results in legal uncertainty. "Do we even need a ministry of information, because it is obviously a relic from the past, and in conflict with the Constitution as well? Is it not the emperor's new clothes all over again?" Degen wonders.

Journalist, SDP [Party of Democratic Changes] deputy, and chairperson of the Assembly's Committee for the Socio-Political System and Information Gordana Grbic believes that now that Croatia is sovereign, and hopefully liberated as well before long, the main task is to establish genuine democratic relations, not only for the sake of Europe, but primarily for the sake of everyone who lives in Croatia. But the role of the mass media in this is extremely important, because without freedom of opinion and expression of ideas, there is no democracy.

There is always the possibility of the misuse of journalists—as a rule, this is done by politicians and the government—but even if that cannot be avoided, then these possibilities must be minimized. Gordana Grbic has a number of concrete comments on the current text, but considers the following warning to be much more important: "The adoption of this sort of law, no matter how liberal, will not mean very much unless there are changes in the provisions of the criminal code which are irresistibly reminiscent of the verbal offense, which has rightly fallen into disrepute, and the brunt of which could be borne by journalists."

Power of the State

Another journalist-politician and member of the leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, Drago

Kastratovic, maintains that information and public speech in general should not become a monopoly of the state, nor of any societal group, that anyone can own a mass medium, but that that media domain must be equally accessible to every citizen, and that professionalism must always be protected. To be sure, not even in the democratic world is the so-called man on the street as well-informed as the minister of foreign affairs, but it is unacceptable for someone to be able to keep at least the most important truths about society and current events from him.

In this little survey of ours, we return to the beginning, because even the president of the Croatian Journalists Society, Ante Gavranovic, says that in some areas there are too many laws and too few real rights. In other words, the process of deregulation—appropriate to a democratic society and market conditions—is only just beginning. The role and power of the state are still felt too strongly.

We will see how willing the government will be to accept the comments of journalists, experts, representatives of parties, and thus of the entire public or at least its representatives, but it appears that this draft law should be fundamentally combed through, and then, of course, changed and adapted to the era of democracy, and not to war and anarchy, or perhaps a new totalitarianism.

[Box, p 30]

Unconstitutional Decree

Right now, we are already discussing the third version of the law, while certain new dilemmas are always emerging anew. The legislator is beset by pitfalls in this regard: It is easy to introduce an undemocratic order, while an opposite approach is more complex. Specifically, there are limits that should not be abandoned. We are talking here about the overall context of European documents and decisions that regulate this area, which the Croatian Assembly has accepted as its basic principle.

In practice, however, things are different. Rather frequently, state organs do not agree to a one-sided monopoly by journalists in news reporting. On the other hand, journalists do not accept (or do not agree to) the state's dictates in terms of information. There is obviously a difference of interests, as well as different ideas about certain rights, but also about certain obligations in the area of information.

This is clearly a process that will not be resolved by law alone.

The latest example, the adoption of the Decree on Information Activities During a State of War or in the Event of an Immediate Threat to the Independence and Unity of the Republic of Croatia, is the best proof of this. The Croatian Journalists Society has issued a demand that the very problem of the constitutionality and legality of this decree be considered, given the fact that it is inappropriate and incomplete. We have the same

attitude towards the incomplete text of Article 197 of the Criminal Code, which relates to criminalizing the spreading of false reports.

—by Ante Gavranovic

[Box, p 31]

Three Realities

When we talk about the proposed law on information, we must take a look at foreign models, but also keep a continuous eye on our own realities. The first reality is very unpleasant: On the eve of and during the course of this war, the transformation of state ownership of the media was completely halted, and because in this sort of state they cannot find financiers, more and more of the media are collapsing every day. Given this state of affairs, some people think that the only salvation for these media houses is nationalization. In contrast to this trend, the new law should open up the possibility that anyone (naturally if he has the money and the technical options) can set up and own any sort of media house.

Likewise, it should be agreed that now, while they are still under state ownership, and tomorrow, when they are in private hands, media houses must be supervised by commissions acting on behalf of the public, and not on behalf of the government. They should also be multipartisan. That is our second reality.

The third reality is a result of the first and second ones. For decades, government totalitarianism has demanded absolute obedience from journalists, reducing their level of professionalism.

—by Drago Kastarovic

[Box, p 31]

New Monolithic Thinking

HRTV [Croatian Radio and Television], which is controlled by one group under instructions from the topmost leadership of the ruling party, has become a fortress of bureaucracy. HRTV is developing a new type of monolithic thinking, so that there should be essential changes in its status, as well as in its tyrannical attitude towards hundreds of journalists and other employees, who in professional terms are much more capable and deserving than those who are currently leading that institution so poorly and undemocratically.

There is well-grounded fear that the otherwise valid principle that "persons who play some sort of role in public life have the right to protect their private lives, except in cases where the latter reflects on public life" will be used to protect the ruling group and its interests, and not to protect civil rights.

At this moment I am thinking most of all of the link between the bureaucracy and wartime profiteering.

Even the Council for the Protection of the Freedom of the Mass Media—a newly proposed body—has too many members appointed by the government. One would conclude from this that it is more important to protect those occupying public posts than the democratic system and the rights and liberties of the citizens.

—by Miko Tripalo

HSP's Paraga Views Ethnic Rivalry

AU2701143592 Vienna DIE PRESSE
in German 27 Jan 92 p 4

[Maren Koester-Hetzendorf report: "The People Like Strong Men"]

[Text] Vienna—"We are a democratic party and democratic people." Dobroslav Paraga, the president of the extreme nationalist "Croatian Justice Party" (HSP) attaches great importance to this statement. He says that the Croatian leadership is responsible for his neofascist image. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman needs a scapegoat for his own failure in the war with Serbia and the Yugoslav Army.

Paraga considers the fact that his men show greater reverence for Ante Pavelic, the founder of the fascist Ustasha state, than for Ante Starcevic, who founded the party in 1861, normal: "The people like strong men." Yet, this does not mean that they are fascists. Like himself (he is 31), most of his people were born much later. The black uniforms worn by the soldiers of the party's military HOS [Croatian Defense Force] wing, reminiscent of Hitler's storm troopers, only express a "romantic attitude" to the events of the time.

Paraga responds to the Serbian demands for a greater Serbia with his own demand for a Greater Croatia. "Serbia must be reduced to the borders of 1912." The Croatia that he envisages would also comprise large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Paraga is convinced that this would not only be what the Croats who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina want, but also what the "Muslim Croats" want. "I know what the people there think."

"We are the hope of the people in Bosnia," the head of the Croatian right-wing party stated. After all, the government in Sarajevo no longer controls large parts of the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Strong army units have been concentrated in the area of Mostar. "We must take charge of the defense of this region." Paraga confirms reports according to which the HOS alone has 16,000 men in western Herzegovina.

Paraga stressed that he "does not love" war, but nevertheless, he is reluctant to support the deployment of UN peace-keeping forces in the conflict area in Croatia. He is convinced that the Serbs will hand in their arms only pro forma, if at all. "They will put their arms in depots in the area and the Serb minority will continue the war." The HOS units in the conflict area will also not be disarmed. Paraga has his own logic: The HOS is part of the

Croatian National Guard; if the Croatian Army were to be disarmed, then Croatia would no longer be independent.

State Council Criticized as 'Echo Chamber'

92BA0311A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
3 Dec 91 p 11

[Article by Kresimir Dzeba, vice president of the Croatian People's Party: "Tudjman in an Echo Chamber"]

[Text] There is no politically mature democratic country that would allow its destiny to depend on the mental capacity of one single man, whoever he might be. History presents to us a multitude of examples of countries that have disappeared and are disappearing, having placed their destiny in the hands of a single man. For that matter, even Croatia has quite a few unhappy experiences of that kind.

Of course, certain countries with a mature democracy do have a presidential or semipresidential system, for example, the United States or France. However, in democratic countries such systems do not mean that an individual has all the power, because of the existence of effective mechanisms that check power. The political opposition, truly free public news media, independent courts, and other mechanisms have real strength. But it is not just a question of those legal and political institutions that guarantee checks and balances of power, but also of the democratic climate of accountability to the public, which in our country became completely stunted in the bolshevik period. In the United States, it is taken for granted that Richard Nixon resigned from the Presidency because of the bugging of some local office of the opposition Democratic Party, which in our country would be an utterly insignificant affair, judging by the fact that some of our officials openly brag that they have excellent equipment of that kind with which they can eavesdrop on anyone they like whenever they like. Now that I have mentioned the "Watergate Affair," it is significant that the rug was pulled out from the feet of President Nixon by two young newsmen on the city desk of THE WASHINGTON POST, that is, a newspaper which our budding HDZ-ites [supporters of the Croatian Democratic Community], overloaded with knowledge, point to as an example of how every government must have "its own" newspapers completely under its thumb.

Of course, none of these mechanisms for controlling power are operative in our case, which is more an observation than any particular criticism. The Western countries have been building their democracy for 200 years, and we have just extricated ourselves—more formally than mentally—from communist totalitarianism. But the right conclusion needs to be drawn from that: that the semipresidential system that is sanctioned by the Constitution does not suit the interests of Croatia and

the development of its democracy, regardless of who is president of the republic today and who will be president tomorrow.

We have pushed the Croatian Assembly, which in the history of the Croats was always the place where national policy was shaped, so far out to the edge that it is possible that at the height of aggression against Croatia this would be debated earlier in the British parliament (the last days of October) than in the "representative body of the citizens and holders of legislative power in the Republic of Croatia," as it is put in the Constitution. It is my impression that the government, as represented by the Cabinet of Ministers, is only fighting for its own autonomy and constitutional powers, most of which have been usurped by the Supreme State Council. As far as the independence of the courts goes, it is a telling detail that the state public prosecutor is a member of the government commission for police policy, he is appointed by the president of the republic, and he is supposed to investigate accountability for the events in Vukovar and the "conspiracy."

As for the freedom of the news media as the "fourth estate," which is the epithet given them by Wilde, if I am not mistaken, it is sad to even talk about it, especially after institution of the "truth ministry," which operates like a censor. This especially applies to the most influential medium, television, which is more and more becoming a true "cathedral of Croatian autocracy." It is natural that under such circumstances the president of the republic should have gone far beyond even his own constitutional powers, already excessive, and personally frustrated Croatian policy, which is not good.

The Supreme State Council should be abolished, there is no question about that. Of course, the president of the republic has the right under the Constitution to establish his own advisory bodies, but in that case it cannot be given a name like that. And it is altogether untenable that the president of the Croatian Assembly and the prime minister should take part in its proceedings as advisers to the president; this discredits the principles of parliamentary democracy concerning the three branches of government, and good taste as well.

Those who support the activity of the Supreme State Council say that it is making decisions that are in the power of the president of the republic under the Constitution. If that is in fact the case, then this is nothing other than recycling the communist practice of collectivizing all manner of things, including political decisionmaking, a practice we are so familiar with. In a democratic society, the person who makes the decision and who bears responsibility for it must be clearly recognizable. In no case can this be some collective advisory (I almost said "self-managing") body, because it does not have that authority, and therefore it cannot be accountable for its decisions.

As my fellow party member Miko Tripalo rightly noted, the operation of any system depends greatly on the

person who holds the most responsible office, and thus de Gaulle, Giscard d'Estaing, and now Mitterrand have governed France differently on the basis of the same semipresidential system. A significant thing about our President Tudjman is that he suffers from the "echo chamber" syndrome, which in the technical literature refers to a phenomenon whereby many leaders—not only in politics, but also in the economy, like to surround themselves with people who "do not create problems," who go along, who do not make difficulties, nor do they offer opposition, who give in and are always and without limit in awe of the wisdom of their superior. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, they refer to such people as yes-men, or as we would put it, approvers. They are true divine punishment for anyone whose duty it is to make responsible decisions; the more responsible the decisions, the more fateful the consequences.

Sarinic Defends State Council

92BA0311B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
3 Dec 91 p 12

[Unattributed interview with Hrvoje Sarinic, chief of staff of the president of Croatia; place and date not given: "Wartime Concentration of Power"]

[Text] [DANAS] There are those who say that the Supreme State Council [VDV] should be abolished; others would merely bring it into line with the Constitution, under which it has only advisory powers. What do you think about these views of the opposition and a segment of the public? We asked Hrvoje Sarinic, chief of staff of the president of the republic.

[Sarinic] I will answer you by asking a question. What do you think the reactions of the opposition would be if the president did not consult with anyone? I am sure that then they would say that President Tudjman has shut himself off from everyone, that he is an autocrat, and who knows what else. This way, when the advisory body does exist and is consulted, and I say in conformity with the Constitution, I see no grounds for criticism. It is said that the VDV has gone outside the constitutional limits, that it has been deciding all manner of things, etc. I am an ex-officio member of the VDV, and I say that this is not true. I am not, of course, surprised by the criticism, at least some of which is evidently meant to challenge the constitutional role of the president of the republic. Critics should think about how much they are confusing and disorienting people: The Constitution was adopted by acclamation, and besides, we are at war, and all countries at war insist on an increased concentration of power. In our case, some people now have forgotten all that and are insisting on a revision of the Constitution when this is the worst time for that. That is, of course, my opinion, and not everyone need share it.

[DANAS] I also mentioned in the question those who would not amend the Constitution, they are seeking only that the VDV be brought into conformity with its provisions.

[Sarinic] I am aware of that. They say that the VDV is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but that is not true. There is mention of advisory bodies which the president has the right to form, and the VDV is just that—an advisory body. Is it so very important that it is not mentioned by name in the Constitution?

[DANAS] Critics will answer you: What kind of advisory body is that when the members are the people in the republic with the greatest political power?

[Sarinic] I do not see why that should be seen as anything bad. The VDV is really made up of all those who represent authority in the Republic of Croatia, but that body does not decide about anything, it stays strictly within the limits of the rights of the president of the republic to consult with all his collaborators before making a decision within his competence.

[DANAS] The public knows little about the proceedings of the VDV. What are its meetings like, who presents the introductory reports, is there just a debate after that, or are conclusions also put to a vote?

[Sarinic] Perhaps it is true that not enough is known, but there is no reason to keep anything secret. The VDV is a body with a variable number of members—12 at the least and 28 at the most—the usual procedure is for the president of the republic to make the introductory statement, and after that there is a debate. There is no vote, nor are any conclusions adopted, the debate simply benefits the president in giving him more elements with which to make some decision within his competence.

[DANAS] The opposition is probably drawing the opposite conclusion, because the meetings of the VDV usually precede important and quite specific decisions of other bodies. There is thus some uncertainty about where the decision was actually made.

[Sarinic] I am aware of those objections, the point they want to make is that the president of the republic is interfering too much with the operation of other institutions. I would not get into that analysis, I would only say that the VDV does not make any decisions at all, that that lies solely in the competence of the president of the republic, and one cannot simply speak casually about how much those decisions coincide or do not coincide with the decisions of other bodies, that would have to be analyzed case by case. Incidentally, because certain people in the opposition are so concerned about this, it needs to be said on behalf of the truth that certain opposition politicians were even members of the VDV some time ago and took an active part in it.

[DANAS] You said that the VDV has a segment of changeable members. Who are they?

[Sarinic] The makeup of the VDV depends on the agenda. There is List A, those are permanent members, List B, and so on, all the way to various experts from whom a position on some issue is expected at a particular point. It is precisely that variability in the membership

of the VDV that proves that this is an advisory body that on one occasion debates one issue and another time other issues.

Transitions to Wartime Economy Examined

92BA0310B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
17 Dec 91 p 15

[Article by Ivo Jakovljevic: "The Wartime Shock Program"]

[Text] Croatia will make the transition to a complete wartime economy (but in the milder present-day version) in the first days of January 1992, when the broadest public anticipates the end of the war or at least cessation of extensive military operations on the soil of the republic. This conclusion of ours is suggested by the most recent package of economic measures which the Croatian government has made public in recent days under the conductor's baton of Prime Minister Franjo Greguric and the deputy prime minister in charge of the economy Jurica Pavelic. This seeming flagrant tardiness in adoption of the wartime shock program is a kind of confirmation that the Serbian aggression this summer drew Croatia against its will into a war in which its economic and financial reserves were at a relatively high level. But those reserves are near an end today.

Most of the war damage in Croatia (nearly \$20 billion) and the scale of Serbian plundering of Croatian property (about \$16 billion), along with the decline in the Croatian gross product during the war (30 percent) and the essential increase in government expenditures for defense, health care, and social welfare, have taken their toll over the last five months. Today, the Croatian state needs extensive financial support both from its own population and from banks and enterprises, but above all from abroad. As the transition is made to 1992, on whose support is the Croatian government counting with the greatest certainty, with the largest share, and in the shortest time?

Greguric's Objectives

The last picture of the situation taken by Greguric's mind in early December showed that the deficit in the republic budget, which is being financed more and more by the government's borrowing from the Croatian central bank, is already reaching 10 percent of the value of the gross product (the upper threshold of supportability is 5-6 percent). It also showed that the deficit in the balance of current transactions with foreign countries could amount to all of \$2 billion in 1992, which would have to be covered with some combination of rescheduling the payable foreign debt and the taking of new loans. An already critical shortage of cash in the trade sector was also noted, and for that reason Croatia will enter the next year with its own currency, although temporary and very vulnerable—the Croatian dinar. At the same time, the number of unemployed and those driven from their homes (300,000 plus 550,000 persons)

is crossing the boundary line of 18 percent of the total population in Croatia. But the largest and gravest loss so far is the more than 25,000 persons killed and wounded.

The main objectives of the Croatian wartime shock program come down to invigorating production, restricting personal consumption, restraining hyperinflation, refinancing external and internal debt, and the healthiest possible financial support of Croatian defense forces along with health care and social welfare institutions. But how are all those objectives to be achieved under the present circumstances of poverty?

In this offering of economic policy measures for next year, the Croatian government has decided on a somewhat milder crossbreed of conventional wartime restrictions and peacetime incentives so as to continue even under the most difficult circumstances the transition from a socialist and government economy to a mixed and open economy. Those circumstances could have been still more difficult, almost disastrous, if by some chance the EC Council of Ministers had not exempted Croatia from its economic sanctions against Yugoslavia; the sanctions would have deprived the Croatian economy of \$500 million of exports!

In the search for money to save it, every government can count on four sectors: the population, the economy, foreign countries, and its own mint. Of those four sectors in Croatia, that of the economy is at the moment in the most difficult state and it needs the strongest injection to rescue it, so that by its invigoration it could later finance the growing expenditures of the state. So that the sectors remaining at the disposition of the government are foreign countries (on which it itself can have the least influence), the domestic population (on which the government can have great influence, though the risks are many), and its own mint (on which the government can have the greatest influence, but runs the greatest political and social risks). Assessing all the pluses and minuses, the Croatian government, it seems, decided to pass on most of the financial burden of the war economy in the early going to the personal sector until there is some sizable growth of production and some fairly significant flow of capital from abroad. At the same time, the government, in collaboration with the National Bank of Croatia, will be promoting the Croatian dinar as a temporary currency, which would be accompanied by a low rate of inflation in society, along with a restrictive monetary policy. What does all this mean in practice?

Just as in 1946

First of all, the government will introduce direct price controls on all products and services important to daily life (food, energy, public transportation, fuel, drugs, rents). Then, many new taxes will be introduced and existing taxes raised, especially on petroleum products, alcohol, tobacco, coffee, and automobiles. Wages and salaries in the socialized sector of the economy and noneconomic activities will be limited by means of the mandatory loan on the work force, which people will pay

on all personal incomes over and above a certain limit (allegedly from 15,000 dinars a month on up), for which they will obtain government bonds that will mature after 1995. Special measures will stimulate production for defense and export as well as agriculture itself. The work obligation, i.e., monopoly of the state over distribution of manpower according to the standards and needs of the state, has already been introduced on a large scale.

The policy governing the exchange rate of the Croatian dinar will be conducted depending on the size of the inflow of capital from abroad, and access to the foreign exchange market will be restricted for individuals. A kind of war loan or reconstruction loan will be floated, above all in foreign exchange, through which about \$500 million could be collected. The sale of publicly owned housing for foreign exchange will also be speeded up. The Paris Club of creditor countries will be asked to reschedule Croatian debt in the amount of \$500 million, and preparations will be made at the same time for Croatia to become a member of the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank. In any case, most of these measures count on attracting capital which the Croatian population has withdrawn from domestic banks over the last two years, but also on money from the emigre community, which under the wartime circumstances up to now has displayed a ready inclination to invest in Croatia and also to send abundant humanitarian aid to the homeland.

There remains just one unknown: Will the population support the burden of the wartime shock program in Croatia if the anticipated financial support of Western governments, banks, and international institutions should not be forthcoming at all?

Macedonia

Federal Army Continues Equipment Withdrawal

AU2701150892 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network
in Macedonian 2100 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Text] According to what Macedonian Radio has learned from witnesses, the Army in our republic has intensified its work on removing not only its equipment, but everything else that can be taken out of the barracks.

Early this morning, a convoy of 29 vehicles set off for Serbia from Bitola. The vehicles were loaded with technical, medical, and other equipment. Last night, a military convoy consisting of some 15 trucks, and the same number of (?jeeps), left the Titov Veles barracks. According to the report we have received from there, intensive activities are obviously also taking place in this barracks today, as well as in the places through which the vehicles will pass.

We do not have any detailed information yet about a long convoy that left the Stip barracks. However, this too says that the Stip barracks are being emptied with unchanged intensity. This evening, 51 Army vehicles

arrived in the (?Aleksa Demijevski Bauman) in Titov Veles. The arrival of this convoy should certainly be linked to the speeding up of removals from the local military hospital. This hospital has 270 beds, two operating theaters, a special laboratory vehicle for the galenic production of medicine, as well as other medical equipment. The hospital could be quickly set up in the areas affected by natural disasters and provide medical help to the population.

Future Macedonian Defense Forces Detailed

92BA0377A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 4 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Zoran Petrov: "An Army Yes, but What Kind?"]

[Text] What we can say today with a relatively high degree of confidence is that Macedonia must have an independent defensive system worthy of respect, consisting of a relatively small but well-equipped and efficient force that, if necessary, would be able to block an eventual attack mounted by an aggressor and make it possible to activate the other parts of its defense system in time.

The development of one's own armed forces or army is no simple task. Macedonia is facing this problem as it awaits international recognition, and simultaneously facing tremendous economic difficulties that it must resolve in an atmosphere of active political and military threats. As it protects its independence, related to the development of its statehood, Macedonia has already initiated the process of intensive legislative activities, which actually means filling the vacuum formed in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Yugoslav union. One of the basic problems, the solution of which is now generating greater interest, is that of implementing the constitutional requirement that Macedonia develop its own defense philosophy by creating a new autonomous defense system. The fact that this is a very complex question was seen at the recently held debate in the Republic's Assembly on "Defense of the Republic of Macedonia in Accordance With the New Constitution," at which several noted experts presented their views and concepts of several aspects and features of defense. Although the impression was that this meeting was something in the nature of a symposium, the speakers nonetheless presented a number of interesting ideas and problems in which, actually, one finds the answer to the question of "what kind of forces, and when the future Macedonian armed forces will be organized."

What Standards Will Apply?

Dr. Trajan Gotsevski, dean of the philosophy department and professor at the chair of United Nations Studies, who was one of the speakers and who is also one of our best known theoreticians of military problems, supports the view that Macedonia must develop an independent model of defense, which would rest on three

main foundations: armed forces, civil defense, and becoming part of the European and global defense systems. Broken down into its components, more reasons appear, which, actually, are strong arguments in favor of having Macedonia organize its own defense. Above all, this applies to the risk factor or the extent of the threat based on the specific surrounding of the Republic as well as its internal ethnic and demographic nature, which, in itself, demands the development of an autonomous defense system that would guarantee total security.

The numerical strength of such an armed force depends, above all, on the standards to be adopted. The figure most frequently cited is 20,000-25,000 privates and noncommissioned officers (or about 1 percent of the Macedonian population), with a so-called broad professional cadre of officers capable of handling the expensive technical facilities and military ordnance. The second segment of the armed forces would be the reserve, which would be significantly larger or, assuming that we adopt the criterion of 5 percent of the population, would total some 100,000 reservists. Civil defense is another important part of defense, the concept of which calls for the extensive involvement of the population in the elimination of all kinds of threats. Becoming part of the European collective security system is also of exceptional importance. Like most countries that are not members of the European Community, Macedonia should find its place in that system. This implies having armed forces for intervention, which is normal to the extent that preliminary assessment of such a step has been accepted.

For Macedonia to develop its own defense system, which, in addition to the Army, implies respective changes in virtually all segments of society, such as the links between defense and internal affairs, finance, justice, the economy, science, and education...that is precisely why today it is almost impossible and futile to make any kind of forecasts, especially by reason of a number of other factors, which include a great many unknown features or, to put it mildly, make the solution of the problem much more difficult.

What Would Happen If...

The resolution of the Yugoslav crisis is one of the first prerequisites for answering a number of questions related to the future Macedonian army because, whereas the constitutional law stipulates that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Macedonia consist of units, staffs, and command personnel of the Macedonian Territorial Defense, one must not forget that that same territorial defense is still part of the Yugoslav Armed Forces or the so-called Yugoslav People's Army. Therefore, to have the frequently mentioned division of Army property, conditions must be created for the Army and the Serbian leadership that stands behind it, to express their joint willingness for each former member of the federation to get back what it invested in that Army. Theoretically, this can be easily computed because one could estimate with no particular difficulty what and how much Macedonia should receive from the armaments and military

ordnance of the present Yugoslav People's Army; in practical terms, however, matters are somewhat different.

The cost of the future defense Macedonian system will also greatly depend on the resolution of this dilemma because, if the Republic must develop its Armed Forces "from scratch," the cost will automatically be at least 10 times higher compared to the familiar global standards, which range from 5 to 10 percent of the national income for an already established defense system. Furthermore, one must take into consideration that, with the declaration of independence, in addition to its present 620 km, Macedonia will acquire another 220 km of border with Serbia, which implies the creation of new border facilities, an infrastructure, and, finally, border security. Another fact to be considered is the need for a new training system for future officers. Nor should we forget that additional investments are needed to develop a local specialized or defense industry, which already consists in part of about 60 larger enterprises working for the Armed Forces. Finally, one cannot ignore the population factor, which directly affects the so-called moral aspect of defense.

It is clear that very difficult work is facing the pertinent ministry and the other specialized services that must draft, define, and submit the law on the defense of the Republic of Macedonia. What can now be said with a relatively high degree of confidence is that Macedonia must develop an independent and respected defense system that will essentially guarantee the security of its space or, in other words, elect to have a relatively small but effective force that, in a given set of circumstances, will be able to block an eventual attack by an aggressor and thus make it possible to activate the other defense factors. This will take time and, above all, skill, tactfulness, and competence, and the resolution of an array of quite substantial problems, which will greatly determine the future nature of Macedonia, whose statehood is currently being formed.

Serbia

Radical Party Leader Comments on Peace Plan

AU2701180292 *Pristina TVP Sat TV*
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Interview with Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party, by Jasmina Milivojevic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Milivojevic] Cyrus Vance's peace plan of sending blue helmets to Krajina was accepted by all interested sides. However, a segment of the Serbian population in the war zones in Croatia has a certain fear of possible manipulation and deceptions by the Croatian sides. This is a lack of knowledge about the details of the plan or something else?

[Seselj] Well, Vance's plan does not completely coincide with the interests of the Serbian nation. The maximum level of our interests would be very difficult to achieve at present.

However, Vance's plan contains some positive elements as it will enable us to get rid of the EC intervention. So, in the best possible case, we can choose the lesser of the two evils. Let us understand each other; I am speaking figuratively, as this plan nevertheless gives some additional guarantees to the Serbian nation living on the territory of Serbian Krajina, that on this occasion the people will not be manipulated and surrender to the interests of Germany and other EC members who would like to tear up parts of the Serbian territory.

The fear of the Serbian nation is always justified, because the Serbian nation, the Serbian Krajinas, have suffered a lot of bloody events throughout recent history. The Serbian nation knows that Croats cannot be trusted and that Croats will use the first opportunity to again start a genocide against Serbs, to do everything they can to prevent the realization of Vance's plan and the principle of self-determination of the Serbian nation.

However, in this case we must bear two things in mind. First, Cyrus Vance is a reputable diplomat. Diplomatic circles consider him to be a very decent and honest man, a man who sticks to principles in foreign policy, which is very important, and which singles him out from some of his EC colleagues. There is no need for me to name them. Also, in this case, Vance's plan is aimed at creating the possibility of a break for the Serbian nation. We need a break. The deployment of blue helmets might last 10 to 20 years, in any case, a long time.

It would be ideal for us if the blue helmets arrived on the demarcation line only. However, one can never accomplish only the ideal things in life, and this option is not the worst one for us because it nevertheless gives us a chance.

[Milivojevic] Is the arrival of blue helmets a sufficient guarantee for a safe and peaceful life of the Serbian people in Croatia? What further guarantees can the Serbs be given besides the guarantees at the international level?

[Seselj] This is one of the guarantees. The other guarantee is that the Yugoslav Army will always be at arm's reach and, if need be, ready to intervene and defend the Serbian nation. Once the blue helmets arrive, they cannot pull out so quickly that we would not have enough time to intervene and again protect the Serbian population there. Also, the weapons will be stored in Krajina and controlled by the police of Serbian Krajina.

In any case, the one who would violate this agreement would have to face the condemnation of world public opinion, and would lose the diplomatic support. Where the Croats used to have the advantage, they would lose the most, while we, the Serbs, would achieve a considerable advantage.

Croat Claims in Western Srem 'Groundless'

LD2701143492 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1335 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, January 27 (TANJUG)—The E.C. observer mission has established that the claims of the Croatian Government representative that the Croats were being persecuted in Western Srem—within the administration borders of the secessionist Yugoslav Republic of Croatia controlled by the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian territorial units—did not correspond to the truth, writes the Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKPRES on Monday.

The E.C. observers have established that the claims of the Croatian side that Croats were being persecuted in the village of Oriolik, i.e. Croats and ethnic Hungarians in the village of Stari Jankovci, and that the Yugoslav Army was burning the Croatian houses in the villages of Cerić and Lipovac, were groundless.

On the contrary, the E.C. observers established that the Croatian para-military formations occasionally opened mortar fire on these villages from their positions and accusing the Yugoslav Army for this.

Touring the villages of Nijemci, Apsevci and Lipovac, the E.C. observers determined that the Yugoslav Army was ensuring equal treatment of both the Serbs and the Croats and that it was doing all it could towards normalization of life in these areas, the paper writes.

Police 'Intensified Repression' in Kosovo

AU2801143192 Zagreb Radio Croatia
in Albanian 2145 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] On the occasion of the anniversary of the deaths of four martyrs in the dramatic events of 1990 in the village of Brestovac near Rahovec [Orahovac], activists of the local Kosovo Democratic Alliance branch laid wreaths on their graves. Returning from this ceremony, these activists were stopped by a Serbian police patrol on the road to Krusha e Madhe [Velika Krusa]. The police also stopped a column of citizens with the national flag at their head who had set off to pay their respects at Brestovac. Ukshin Hoti was arrested and later released, while Gafur Hoti fared worse and was wounded by the police.

The Serbian police has intensified repression in this area and many other parts of Kosovo. For instance, the police fired into the air with automatic rifles in the market of Skenderaj [Srbica], on the pretext of searching for an Albanian. The inhabitants of Skenderaj and villagers from Drenice who had come to town protested and forced the police to retreat. This provocation on market day in Skenderaj is an example of the increasingly frequent provocations in this area after the events one month ago in Prekaz i Ulet [Donje Prekaze].

TANJUG Said Distancing Politically From Markovic
92BA0332B Belgrade BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 27 Dec 91 p 11

[Article by Ivan Radovanovic: "News for the New State"]

[Text] The first part of the rather entangled story about events in TANJUG ended two days ago when a referendum of the work force voted no confidence in the director and editor in chief. According to some assertions (of some of the employees), this also means "shutting down" that TANJUG and its moving under the "watchful eye" of Milosevic's present government in Serbia, while according to others, the referendum only represents proof that the work force wants to change the editorial policy they have had up to now and "face reality"—in other words, become the news agency of the state in which they work.

In any case, the storm in TANJUG has lasted quite a long time now. Back last year, the independent trade union called for a referendum on the editor in chief, saying that he simply was not up to the situation and that TANJUG needed new people.

At just about the same time, a strong current also emerged in TANJUG which felt that the agency ought to turn more to "Serbian interests" and accused Mladen Arnautovic, editor in chief, and Risto Lazarov, director, of being "excessively attached" to Ante Markovic and the Reformist Party.

A few months ago, that current also formed an Initiating Committee [IO], which soon thereafter called for a referendum to be scheduled on confidence in the editor in chief. Rather sharp divisions have been occurring in TANJUG, and among the many stories making the rounds of the house are those about the ties between the Initiating Committee and Ratomir Vic, who at that time was Serbian information minister (he first refused "cooperation" with the committee and then "submitted" and, according to many people, in fact organized everything), as well as about a somewhat more recent "deal" with Aleksandar Mitrovic, vice president of the FEC [Federal Executive Council].

The Man From the Serbian Agency

According to information from inside, the principal figures in the Initiating Committee are Dusan Zupan, until recently TANJUG's correspondent from the United States, and Dusan Radovanovic, deputy editor in chief, whose name is otherwise associated with the story about last year's initiative to form a Serbian news agency.

Of those two, we were able to find only Zupan, who readily answered all our questions about events in the agency. According to him, and this was also confirmed by members of other currents, everyone in TANJUG agrees that Mladen Arnautovic should leave the post of

chief and responsible editor. Zupan goes on to say that the "Serbian line" is not the decisive reason for the action of the IO, but that it, the IO simply feels that TANJUG must be the agency "of the country which will remain after this melee."

"We want to extract TANJUG from the influence of Ante Markovic's FEC and the Alliance of Reform Forces, to whose position the agency's leadership has so far been paying exceedingly close attention, to create a multiparty independent agency, and to go through ownership transformation so as to become the service of the newspapers of the country we are in." Mr. Zupan also told us that the Initiating Committee does not have its candidate for the top position in TANJUG and that it wants this to be decided in a referendum of the work force. In answer to the question of whether the stories are true to the effect that members of the IO have already gone to Director Lazarov with a personal "editorial wish list" (and whether they had proposed themselves for particular positions), Zupan answered that he did not present any list, that there is no such list, and that "various stories are making the rounds" of TANJUG.

Referendum on the Former Editor

In spite of this denial by Zupan, so we have learned, yesterday the other (first) key man in the IO, Dusan Radovanovic, took over Arnautovic's previous post, and in the first collegium replaced Ljubica Markovic and Dusan Reljic, editor and deputy of the foreign program. Dusan Zupan himself was made the new editor of the program.

The second, obviously weaker, "force" in TANJUG—the independent trade union, which was also at one time (and is even now) in favor of Arnautovic's departure, feels that nevertheless the Initiating Committee should not have been calling all the shots.

"We do not accept the harangue, nor anyone's departure for 'anti-Serbism,'" says Dragan Janjic, leader of the independent trade union. Although he feels that Arnautovic "was not up to handling the situation," we also learn from Janjic that it is "rather strange that certain members of both the collegium and the Initiating Committee (Dusan Radovanovic is the only one) are now seeking Arnautovic's departure, but a year ago, when the independent trade union was seeking the same thing, they fervently defended that same Arnautovic." "It seems that that suited them at the time," is Janjic's comment.

Finally—yet another datum to entangle things still more—Mladen Arnautovic, the editor in chief over whom there was such an uproar, submitted his resignation two weeks ago. Still stranger, the FEC accepted that resignation and dismissed him from the position last Friday, five days before the referendum was held!

"I was on vacation," we were told yesterday by Arnautovic, who did not want to comment excessively on the whole story. All we were able to get from him is

that the "populist current" had been victorious in TANJUG and that "that is how it is in a time of emotions rather than principles."

The second key figure at TANJUG from whom the work force withdrew confidence, Risto Lazarov, the director, declined yesterday to comment on the whole case.

For the moment, we still do not know whether the FEC has debated his case nor whether Dusan Radovanovic has taken over the position of editor in chief with consent of the federal government. Again, on the other side, it seems that the issue of TANJUG has not been altogether cleared up even in the government itself. That is, a few days before the referendum Mustafa Cengic, deputy federal secretary for information, sent a letter of support to Lazarov and Arnautovic in which he called for stopping the "illegal groups," "putschists and individuals influenced from outside," and "actions outside the law." In all of these epithets, Cengic is referring precisely to the members of the Initiating Committee and what they are doing.

Vuk Draskovic's Attorney Comments on Indictment
92BA0391B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
13 Jan 92 p 20

[Interview with Strahinja Kastratovic, lawyer for Vuk Draskovic, by J. Floric; place and date not given: "An Indictment With a Political Background"]

[Text] Is Vuk Draskovic to blame for the 9 March demonstrations that took place in Belgrade last year? Judging by the indictment filed a few days ago by the First Opstina Public Prosecutor's Office, one would say that he is. That is, they are charging the leader of the largest opposition party in Serbia with the death of two people, the serious physical injuries of six, and the minor physical injuries of 93 persons, as well as property damage amounting to about 15.5 million dinars. For all of these crimes for which he is being held directly or indirectly responsible, the president of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] could be sentenced to a total of 15 years in prison.

Draskovic has been given a period of eight days to answer the indictment.

"At the end of the eight days, if the defendant or his counsel do not use them for filing an answer to the indictment, the indictment becomes final, and the way is opened for a trial to be scheduled before the court in the first instance," BORBA was told by Strahinja Kastratovic, Vuk Draskovic's lawyer, who added: "Because Mr. Draskovic has refused to file an answer to the indictment, the indictment has taken effect for all practical purposes."

[Floric] If Vuk Draskovic is guilty, why is he being tried only now, and if he is not guilty, why are proceedings being instituted?

[Kastratovic] I would not like to speak about the question of guilt, because that is completely pointless in a case which above all has a political dimension.

Political matters are spoken about by political means, above all through political orientation, not by an arrest and criminal prosecution. Criminal proceedings were instituted in this case against my client on 22 April 1991. His "defense" given before the investigating judge of the First Opstina Court in Belgrade is well-known to the public, and it has exactly the same content as the letter mentioned. Since that time, as far as Draskovic knows, and still more as far as I know myself, nothing has happened that we have been informed of.

If investigatory proceedings have been conducted, if witnesses have been interrogated, if decisions have been brought down, that is, if there has been any investigatory action conducted in these investigatory proceedings between April and December of last year, when the case was returned to the prosecutor, this was done without Mr. Vuk Draskovic and without me as his lawyer. Because I was never summoned by the court, and because I certainly was not curious, always assuming that this is an exclusively political matter, not a matter in criminal law, I do not know what it could have been that occurred in this period if anything at all did occur.

It seems that this entire case was standing still and at one point it occurred to someone to pursue this criminal case by holding a criminal trial against the leader of the SPO. Serbia has had more urgent and important matters, and I find no justification at all for the Serbian people to be unnecessarily disturbed by the criminal prosecution of the president of the strongest Serbian opposition party and above all when it is suffering from the war and economic troubles.

[Floric] On what will you base your defense?

[Kastratovic] I have already said that the conception of defense has been defined by Mr. Vuk Draskovic. His view is that he will not defend himself and that the court will serve him as a place in which he will be able to say what actually occurred on 9 March. He will make accusations and will say who the guilty parties are, and that is the defense that I will use.

I must say that the criminal prosecution of Vuk Draskovic is a hasty decision when you bear in mind that in the civilized world no one can be subjected to criminal prosecution for political activity, least of all when the government is to blame for certain events, having likewise acted hastily, confusedly, and aimlessly.

Slovenia

Economic Relations Urged Despite Politics
92BA0382B Ljubljana DNEVNIK
in Slovene 7 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Marjan Lekse: "Economic War Is Stupidity"—first paragraph is DNEVNIK introduction]

[Excerpt] Slovene exports have been increasing recently; several markets are being closed.

Ljubljana, 7 Jan—Belgrade's POLITIKA commented on the recent warning by the Federation of Slovene Economists that "relations between economic entities have become a weapon of politics and the authorities" and that economists should oppose this with the "power of arguments," with the opinion that "the real reasons for the sudden awakening of the Slovene economists lie in the fact that the Slovenes' market has been reduced almost fivefold. The bills for their decision to secede have finally started to arrive.... There is no reason not to buy the Slovenes' goods, or anybody else's, for example, their televisions, but only on the condition that they are more attractive than Sony's in price and quality," POLITIKA wrote.

In connection with this, we spoke with several businessmen, who, among other things, explained several other aspects of the problem reported by the prominent Belgrade newspaper.

Businessmen want to do business normally, emphasized Branko Tramsek, a secretary at the Slovene Economic Chamber (GZS). He also based this observation on a recent conference of businessmen in Belgrade, where they all stated, one after another, that an economic war was a great stupidity, and expressed the need for continued economic cooperation. In fact, the economies of the independent republics still need markets now.... They need our market, and we need theirs, as was stated in the discussions.

The directors think that the economies are very interconnected, and consequently they are demanding that their governments agree as soon as possible on continuing economic cooperation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and they are advocating the cancellation of all measures that prevent this, such as additional tariffs and additional taxes, confiscations of property, etc., which is contrary to modern principles of commerce and economic cooperation.

There are also exceptions, of course, and Branko Tramsek pointed out the opinion of one of the directors there, who said that Slovenia was the kind of economic force for the Yugoslav market that West Germany was for Europe. "And if we close the market to that force," thought the director of an enterprise that would become a big monopolist in the Serbian market without Slovene competition, "the Serbian economy and people will buy primarily domestic goods, and in two years or so they will create the conditions for cooperation with more demanding markets."

It is more or less possible to predict the consequences of such an administrative closing of the market. But what are the conditions for economic cooperation like?

Slovenia does not have any quantitative or value restrictions on imports from other republics of the former Yugoslavia; it is only necessary to pay 1 percent of the value of the imported goods for the expenses of customs records, and this is also charged in all the other republics.

Croatia, in contrast to Slovenia, is restricting imports, primarily of wine and beer, but also of canned fish, chickens.... Serbia has increased sales taxes on goods from Slovenia and Croatia, and recently, as reported by the media [as published], has also introduced an additional 25-percent import tax. Both Serbia and Croatia are restricting exports of certain foods, and Serbia is also restricting the sale of certain strategic raw materials. Montenegro is more or less following Serbia's model....

Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have not introduced additional restrictions, but on the other hand there are considerable difficulties in payment transactions with them. To be sure, Slovenia has already signed an agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina on payment transactions, but it has not yet signed one with Macedonia. It has also signed one already with Croatia, but payment transactions are still not going smoothly.

It is still hard to give any precise assessment of the reduction in the market at this time, since the authorities are still checking customs declarations. In spite of this, GZS Vice President Dagmar Suster explained to us the Chamber's projection for this year, which is still based on data from the third quarter of last year. If Slovene exports this year were to increase by 25 to 35 percent in comparison with last year's (calculated according to data from the third quarter of last year), they would compensate for that much of a reduction in sales to the Yugoslav market, if domestic purchases remained approximately unchanged. In this regard, the Chamber's vice president emphasized that Slovene exports had been increasing in recent months; this is obviously positive, and consequently everything possible should be done to have this continue.

And what about Slovene television receivers, which POLITIKA mentioned?

Marjan Lipovsek, an official in charge of public relations at the Gorenje Concern, said that Gorenje Elektronika was probably one of the few factories, if not the only one, that was still making television receivers on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It plans to export at least half the television receivers this year, which would mean a threefold increase in the value of color television exports. The demand for Slovene television receivers particularly increased abroad after Gorenje presented its new design and chassis last August at the IFA international video and audio equipment fair in Berlin. In any case, Gorenje does not have any factory that would not export at least half of its production, since some of them are already exporting up to 90 percent of their production abroad. Of course, Gorenje has already been exporting for many years, since 1961, while many others were "taking shelter" in the closed Yugoslav market, our interlocutor told us.

With all of this, thoughts about an even greater inclusion in Europe are not unfounded. Finally, we can wonder how it is that no one commented on an idea from two German liberals visiting Slovene colleagues last year in Ljubljana, when they also mentioned during the lecture the possibility of an economic union of Slovenia and Austria.

The economy really should not recognize borders... and especially not the ones that people now want to establish for it in certain markets.

[Box, p 3]

Barter Trade

Basically, almost all trade among the former Yugoslav republics is barter trade. It is hard to say how long it will remain

this way. The Economic Chamber of Slovenia has already proposed that the government, as soon as possible, arrange and conclude economic cooperation agreements within the free trade zone with the other former Yugoslav republics. We are talking about a free flow of goods produced on the territory of the participants of the agreement on a free trade zone. The term "domestic [Slovene] goods" applies to the products that contain mostly (more than half) domestic material, parts, and know-how.